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Preface 
 
This report presents the results and conclusions of research carried out by the JRC/IPTS 
analysing two demand-side policy instruments that can help improve the environmental 
performance of cars: the first instrument, the feebate system, is a way to adjust the registration 
taxes according to the CO2 car emissions; the second instrument, the scrappage policy, is 
intended to encourage the owners of old cars to scrap their cars sooner. 
 
The potential for and the consequences of technical options for reducing car weight are also 
analysed. 
 
This report develops a comprehensive assessment of these policy options at the EU level, 
covering all major environmental life-cycle impacts and the different economic impacts. The 
report builds upon IPTS research, supported by a study subcontracted to research consortium 
led by Transport&Mobility Leuven (TML) and involving Öko-Institut and ISI-Fraunhofer. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last years, efforts have been made and new policy instruments have been introduced 
to improve the environmental performance of cars. The Euro5 and Euro6 emission standards 
will lead to substantial improvement of air quality as a result of lower exhaust gas emissions 
from cars, especially concerning nitrogen oxide (NOX) and particulates. With the new EU 
regulation on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from cars, car manufacturers are committed to 
reducing car emissions. In addition to these supply-side policies, consumer-side measures are 
also considered, including the labelling of CO2 car emissions and the inclusion of CO2 
elements in road taxes. 
 
This report presents the results and conclusions of research carried out by the JRC/IPTS 
analysing such demand-side measures, with a focus on two cases. The first instrument, the 
feebate system, is a way to differentiate the registration taxes according to CO2 car 
emissions. The second instrument, the scrappage policy, is intended to encourage the owners 
of old cars to scrap their car sooner. 
 
The potential and the impacts of technical options for reducing car weight are also analysed. 
 
This report develops a comprehensive assessment of these policy options at the EU level, 
covering all major environmental life-cycle impacts and the different economic impacts, 
including impacts on the consumer, on public finance, and on the industry sectors. The report 
builds upon IPTS research, supported by a study subcontracted to research consortium led by 
Transport&Mobility Leuven (TML) and involving Öko-Institut and ISI-Fraunhofer. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The methodological approach combines different analytical tools:  
1. The TREMOVE model which is a policy assessment model designed to study the 
effects of different transport policies. 
2. A new database and a new TREMOVE module containing information about the 
composition of new and End-of-Life Vehicles (ELVs) and of spare car parts in the 
EU27, and a life-cycle assessment calculation module. 
3. The EU27 Input-Output tables fed with TREMOVE outputs are used to analyse the 
impacts of policy options on the overall economy. 
 
The environmental and economic impacts have been analysed against baseline assumptions 
and scenario common to these three tools. 
 
Regarding transport, the assumptions were consistent with the latest modelling with 
TREMOVE. The assumptions about CO2 emissions from cars have been aligned with those 
made in the impact assessment of the regulation on CO2 from cars, namely assuming a 
constant average CO2 emission level of new cars from 2006 onwards (160 g CO2/km). Euro5 
and Euro6 emission standards are included in the baseline. 
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Lightweight case 
 
The potential of lightweight car options was assessed as an alternative baseline based on 
assumptions on car compositions. The literature reviewed suggests that a weight reduction of 
up to 25-30% is technically achievable in the medium term by means of an intensive use of 
lightweight materials (e.g. aluminium, high-strength steels, and/or magnesium). However, a 
broad market penetration of such light cars appears much less realistic. Therefore, the 
quantified scenario variant was limited to a 15% reduction by the year 2030, and was assumed 
to be primarily based on an increased use of high-strength steels and aluminium. 
 
As a result of the fuel savings from the gradual car weight reduction, it is estimated that 246 
Mt CO2-eq could be avoided over the period 2010 to 2020. Although the regulation on CO2 
emissions from cars focuses on new engine technologies, car lightweighting thus represents a 
significant potential for reducing CO2 emission from cars. 
 
 
Feebate 
 
The consumer preference for greater efficiency cars can be enhanced by introducing CO2 
elements in registration and circulation taxes. One particular case is the feebate (or 
bonus/malus) system, as introduced recently in several EU countries. A feebate system 
combines elements of both a fee and a rebate, thus providing a price incentive towards cars 
with lower CO2 emission levels. The idea is that the rebate granted for cleaner vehicles is 
financed by the fees imposed on vehicles that are less clean. 
 
The so-called pivot point is the CO2 emission level below which a rebate (bonus) is granted 
and above-which a fee (malus) is applied. This pivot-point (PP) can be set in accordance with 
CO2 emission targets as defined by the new regulation on CO2 emissions from cars (e.g. 130 
g/km by 2012 and 95 g/km by 2020). In the case of a discontinuous system, it could be 
coupled with the labelling of CO2 car emissions, especially when both systems are using a 
common CO2 emissions classification (e.g. classes A, B,..., G). The system may also be 
designed in accordance with public budget constraints. 
 
Several feebate cases were subjected to assessment, covering different pivot points (120 g 
CO2/km or 140 g CO2/km), different rebate and/or fee levels and function shapes. The 
instrument is assumed to be in place over the period 2010-2015. 
 
The assessment of the environmental and economic effects of this scheme was based on the 
modeling of the reaction of the car purchaser to the new taxation regime, and response in 
terms of new preferred car fuel efficiency, making use of available information about the car 
purchase preferences in terms of CO2 emission performance, and abatement costs. 
 
There is obvious room for improvement of the modeling approach and the data used. 
Nevertheless, some key conclusions can be drawn from this assessment. 
 
In general, a feebate system is almost neutral in terms of total new car sales but there is a clear 
shift to smaller cars and, given the incentive to shift the purchase decisions to lower CO2 
emitting cars, the policy instrument results in reductions of GHG car emissions. This holds 
true both in the short term (by 2015) and in the long term (by 2020). Positive effects on air 
pollution, though of less importance, are also expected. These conclusions are also valid when 
considering the life-cycle impacts. 
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In total, households would spend more money on cars because the higher cost is not fully 
compensated by the fuel savings. Budget neutrality for the government is shown to be 
achievable, especially in the short term, but may be more difficult to guarantee in the longer 
term. 
 
In general, the real-life outcome may vary depending on the initial purchase patterns and the 
initial taxation regime which both depend on the situation of each country. 
 
At a macro-economic level, the sectors directly concerned (the automotive sector and the 
supply sectors, metal sector) would gain both in terms of value added and employment. 
Depending on the feebate scheme, the net effects on other sectors would be either neutral or 
negative. In total a small net creation of employment is expected in most cases. 
 
In conclusion, the feebate instrument would benefit both the environment and the economy. 
 
 
Cash for replacement policy 
 
Old cars have a disproportionate contribution to total air emissions from the European car 
fleet because they are equipped with inefficient air emission abatement technologies. The 
decommissioning of these high-polluting cars can be accelerated if an incentive is granted to 
car owners who scrap their old cars. Generally, two types of scrappage schemes exist: 
• A cash-for-scrappage policy option, under which the incentives available disregard the 
subsequent replacement car-owner decision (e.g. no replacement and/or purchase of a 
public transport pass). 
• A cash-for-replacement option, under which the incentive payment is conditional upon 
a specific kind of replacement vehicle being chosen (e.g. a new-model car). 
 
The possible types of scrappage schemes can differ in terms of duration, eligibility criteria to 
the subsidy (e.g. age of the old car, characteristics of the new cars), and subsidy level, all of 
which may be adjusted to fit with the primary aim of the policy (i.e. improvement of air 
quality vs. supporting the car industry). 
 
This report focuses on the assessment of the cash-for-replacement policy, covering a series of 
illustrative cases where the key parameters chosen were the age of the old car (8 to 10 years) 
and the subsidy level (1000€ to 2500€, with possible changes throughout the policy period). 
The policy is assumed to be in place over the period 2010-2015. 
 
Further developments in TREMOVE have been made to model the policy, which consisted of 
converting the initially exogenous scrappage function into an endogenous function. This 
conversion was built upon available data on accidents, and on the relevant costs factors (e.g. 
repair and maintenance cost, costs of new cars, and second-hand market price). 
 
The method could, in the future, be refined and enriched with more accurate data. 
Nevertheless, some key conclusions can be drawn from this assessment. 
 
The scrappage policy leads to a quick car fleet renewal. Most of the effects are observed 
within the first two years of the scheme, unless the subsidy starts with low levels and then 
gradually increases. The strength of the effects is predominantly determined by the subsidy 
level. Dramatic sales increases are projected with subsidies as high as 2000€.  
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The rapid renewal of the car fleet is accompanied by acceleration in the expected decline of 
air emissions. The conclusions regarding CO2 emissions are more ambiguous. In any case, the 
effects would disappear after phasing out the scheme. 
 
The expected leap in energy efficiency from the old scrapped cars to the new ones during the 
operation of the policy (2010-2015) would not be sufficient to enable real gains in energy and 
CO2 emissions. In case of a delayed scheme, the gain would be higher because it would 
operate under a more radical decline of new car emissions (130 g/km by 2015, 95 g/km by 
2020).  
 
Also, given the fact that the scrappage policy instrument would, in the short term, pull up 
sales of slightly more efficient cars, the car fleet renewal would later be reduced, when car 
emissions are substantially declining. This means that the scrappage policy could potentially 
reduce the effects of the policy target.  
 
Thus, from an environmental perspective, it can thus be concluded that the scrappage policy 
(applied alone) would come late with regard to air pollution and too early with regard to 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The impacts from car manufacturing, which would substantially increase, partly compensate 
for well-to-wheel emission reductions. 
 
Overall, the household expenditures for cars would increase alongside the tax revenues from 
passenger cars. The policy would clearly benefit employment in the automotive sector and 
other related sectors. However, this would be accompanied by employment losses in other 
sectors. In total, provided that fast adjustments occur, the scrappage policy would result in a 
small net creation of employment. 
 
 
Compared strengths and weaknesses 
 
The results for the two policy instruments are summarized and compared in Table 1. 
 
The feebate system offers clear, significant and long term benefits with regard to energy 
savings and CO2 emission reductions. Thus, it would help to reach the goal of the EU strategy 
to reduce CO2 car emissions. The emission reductions (about 236 Mt CO2-eq, over the period 
2010-2020) would indeed complement the expected effects of the supply-side element of the 
strategy, namely, the regulation on CO2 car emissions. 
 
The effects of the scrappage policy on CO2 emissions are not as clear. On the other hand, it 
has rapid and important effects in terms of air pollutant emissions, even though they mainly 
consist of bringing forward baseline improvements by two to four years. 
 
Moderate and high increases in car expenditures for the consumers are expected under the 
feebate and the scrappage policy, respectively. The short term revenue for the governments is 
expected to increase in both cases although specific feebate schemes might result in net 
losses. 
 
Both instruments are expected to result in a comparable small net creation of employment at 
EU27 level. However, the sector distribution of benefits would differ: the scrappage policy 
would the most benefit the automotive and related sectors. It would however entail 
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employment losses in most other sectors, whereas, the feebate instrument offers options to 
limit such negative consequences. 
 
This report shows that the combination of both instruments would represent an advantage for 
the environment. The respective environmental benefits would indeed be cumulated, thus 
ensuring long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and, also accelerating the already 
expected improvement for air quality. 
 
Other options to secure the environmental benefits were not analysed in the study. This would 
for instance consist in applying CO2-based criteria on the new car replacing the scrapped one. 
 
Regarding effects on the economy, the coupling would enhance the positive effects on 
employment in the automotive-related sectors. The accumulation effect would however also 
prevail for the negative effects on the other sectors. 
 
When using these results and conclusions, it is important to bear in mind that the research was 
initiated and conducted within a favorable economic context. An interpretation of these results 
in light of the current economic crisis and low oil prices needs to be made with caution. 
 
Table 1: Overview of results for the feebate and for the scrappage policies  
Numbers give the percentage changes relative to the corresponding total baseline quantities 
(first, average value; second, range of values in italic) 
2010 - 2015
Total -0.1% -0.3% to 0.1% 25.4% 4.7% to 41.5%
Fuel
Size
2010 - 2020 -0.3% -0.5% to -0.2% 6.0% 1.1% to 13.7%
Well-to-wheel emissions
2010 - 2015
GHG -1.6% -2.6% to -0.7% -1.3% -2.6% to -0.4%
CO -0.1% -0.1% to -0.1% -18.4% -29.9% to -7.0%
NOx -0.4% -0.7% to -0.2% -3.8% -6.7% to -1.4%
SOx -1.7% -2.7% to -0.7% -1.9% -3.8% to -0.6%
VOC -0.4% -0.7% to -0.2% -8.8% -13.0% to -3.8%
PM -0.9% -1.5% to -0.4% -2.6% -5.6% to -0.7%
2010 - 2020
GHG -1.8% -2.9% to -0.8% -0.8% -1.3% to -0.3%
NOx, PM
CO, VOC
Life cycle impacts (2010-2015)
2010-2015
Total costs for the consumer 0.9% 0.5% to 1.2% 4.4% 1.0% to 9.0%
Total tax revenue 1.2% -0.4% to 2.6% 2.9% 0.5% to 6.4%
Total employment 0.04% -0.01% to 0.08% 0.02% 0.00% to 0.06%
                         (Most probably overestimated reductions)
                         (Most probably overestimated reductions)
Effects declining slowly up to 2020
Economic impacts 
Of the same order of impacts on Well-to-
wheel emissions
Well-to-wheel emissions reductions partly compensated 
for by the increased impacts from production of cars 
and spare parts
Effects declining slowly up to 2020
Baseline emission reductions expected over 2010-2020 
brought forward by 2 years
Baseline emission reductions expected over 2010-2020 
brought forward by 4 years
Scrappage policyFeebate policy
Diesel cars share slightly increased in the fleet
Environmental impacts
Big/medium cars share slightly increased in the fleetPossible shift from medium to small
Car sales
Shift from diesel to petrol
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1 Introduction 
 
This report presents the results and conclusions of research carried out by the JRC/IPTS 
analysing two policy instruments aimed at reducing the environmental impacts of passenger 
cars. The research was conducted on the request of DGENV and complements the IMPRO-
car report (Nemry et al., 2008)1 which reviewed and assessed the environmental impacts and 
costs of technological improvements for reducing the life-cycle impacts from cars. That study 
primarily addressed the question on the extent to which supply-side policy instruments, 
additional to those already in place or in preparation, could help improve the environmental 
performance of cars.  
 
The main focus of this report is on consumer-side policies, analysing more specifically two 
main policy instruments: 
• Policy options to encourage consumers to buy low CO2 emitting cars. 
• Policy options to encourage the earlier car retirement with a view to accelerate the 
market penetration of cleaner technologies. 
 
The potential and the consequences of technical options for reducing car weight while 
keeping the same utility level were also assessed. 
 
This report builds upon JRC/IPTS research and a study subcontracted to research consortium 
led by Transport&Mobility Leuven (TML) and involving Oko-Institut and ISI-Fraunhofer. 
 
Over the past recent years, efforts and regulatory instruments have been put in place, with a 
view to improving the environmental performance of cars. Major examples are the tightening 
of Euro standards, towards Euro5 and Euro6 which will lead to substantial improvement in air 
quality as a result of lower exhaust gas emissions from cars (especially NOx, particulates). 
 
Very recently, the EU has adopted a new regulation to reduce CO2 car emissions. This new 
regulation is part of a more comprehensive strategy to reduce the CO2 emissions from cars, in 
which demand-side measures are also envisaged (raising awareness and taking fiscal 
measures). 
 
This policy framework was taken into account when specifying the policy options considered 
in this study. Both policy instruments should indeed be designed in such a way as to enable 
synergies. Also, the literature was reviewed where the policy options are described and 
assessed in terms of their respective strengths and weaknesses. This helped further specifying 
the project scope in terms of considered policy cases. 
 
Finally, a methodology was set up and implemented in order to perform an ex ante assessment 
of the policy cases, including the environmental and economic impacts for the EU27. 
 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 describe the policy background and the main findings from literature 
regarding the two possible options considered in the project, respectively. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the overall methodology for the assessment, including the TREMOVE 
modeling, life-cycle assessments, and the Input-Output table approach and how these tools 
have been combined to provide a comprehensive analysis. 
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Chapter 5 presents the main assumptions regarding the baseline scenario built with the 
TREMOVE model which served as the reference to subsequently assess the two policy 
options. An alternative baseline is also presented where more ambitious assumptions are made 
in terms of reducing the weight of cars. 
 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 present the approach and results regarding the analysis of the feebate 
and the scrappage policy cases. Chapter 8 provides the results for the combination of those 
policy options. 
 
Conclusions are then presented in chapter 9. 
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2 Policy background 
 
2.1 Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from cars 
 
In 2007, the European Commission proposed a new strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from 
cars up to 120 g CO2/km by 2012 (EC, 2007)2, based on a set of measures for influencing 
both the supply and demand sides of the EU market for cars and vans. 
 
The strategy was formerly based upon voluntary commitments by the European, Japanese and 
Korean car industries to reduce CO2 emissions from their new cars sold in the EU to an 
average of 140g/km by 2008/2009. However, in light of the average CO2 emissions over the 
period (from 186 g CO2/km to 163 g CO2/km between 1995 and 2004 – see most up-to-date 
values in (EC, 2006)3 -, a revised strategy was proposed in order to achieve faster and 
stronger emission reductions. 
 
One of the main measures of the revised strategy consists of supply-side measures and 
especially the EU regulation to reduce CO2 emissions from new cars and vans (see Section 
2.2) aimed of reducing the emissions of the new car fleet to 130 g CO2/km by 2015, by means 
of improvement in vehicle motor technology. Additional measures are aimed at further 
reducing the emissions by 10 g CO2/km, which include other technological improvements and 
an increase of the use of biofuels. 
 
Consumer-side measures are also envisaged, including an amendment to the car labelling 
directive and the encouragement of Member States to base road taxes on car CO2 emissions. 
 
 
2.2 Regulatory CO2 emission reduction target 
 
The regulation on CO2 from cars4 sets the average CO2 emissions for new passenger cars at 
130 g CO2/km in 2015. The proposal is based on the monitoring of specific emissions of CO2 
of passenger cars which is given by the so-called limit value curve. 
 
For each calendar year, the specific emission target will be calculated as the average of the 
specific emissions of CO2 of each manufactured car. 
 
In 2012, 65% of each manufacturer's newly registered cars must comply on average with the 
limit value curve set by the legislation. This will be raised to 75% in 2013, 80% in 2014, and 
100% from 2015 onwards. 
 
For the period 2012-2015, the limit value curve is as follows: 
Specific emissions of CO2 (g/km) = 130 g/km + a × (M – M0) 
where: M = mass in kg, M0 = 1372 kg, a = 0.0457 (1000 km)-1 
 
That curve is set in such a way that heavier cars will have to improve more than lighter cars. 
However, manufacturers will still be able to make cars with emissions above the limit value 
curve provided that these are balanced by cars which are below the curve. The progress of 
manufacturers will be monitored each year by the Member States on the basis of new car 
registration data. 
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From 2016 onwards, the coefficient M0 will be updated. 
 
In case car manufacturers do not comply with these emission limits, they will have to pay 
penalty which is set to increase over time. 
 
A longer target of 95 g CO2/km is specified for the year 2020 and associated modalities will 
have to be defined in a review to be completed before 2013. 
 
 
2.3 Raising consumer awareness  
 
As part of the new Community strategy on CO2 emissions from cars, the Labelling Directive 
(Directive 1999/94/EC) is being revised. The adoption of a proposal is foreseen for 2009. The 
purpose of the existing directive is to ensure that information relating to the fuel economy and 
CO2 emissions of new passenger cars offered for sale or lease in the Community is made 
available to consumers in order to enable consumers to make an informed choice (Article 1).  
To this end, a label on fuel efficiency and CO2 emissions has to be displayed near each 
passenger car model at the point of sale (Art.3 and Annex I). The harmonisation and 
specification of the format of the label fall under the revision process. Several options are 
open, especially the choice between an "absolute" and a "relative" labelling: an isolated figure 
on fuel consumption or CO2 emissions does not mean much to the consumer and it is 
important to put this information into context by using, for instance, efficiency classes (i.e. A 
(best) to G (worst) classes). There are two ways of providing this comparison: 
• Absolute labelling: the A-G classes relate to the absolute emission level of the car. A 
car with very low emissions would get an "A" label, whereas one with very high 
emissions would get a "G" regardless of their size or type.  
• Relative labelling: the A-G classes relate to the emission levels of cars in the same 
category in terms of size or type. Thus, a large car can still have an "A" label if it is 
among the best-performing cars in that category. Likewise, a small car can have a "G" 
label if other cars from the same category have even lower emissions. 
 
A combination of elements of absolute and relative labels is also conceivable.  
 
A point worth noting is that this updated instrument would provide the consumer with key 
information regarding the environmental performance of cars, thus, to a large extent meeting 
the goal of the eco-label system. 
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3 Demand-side policy options for the analysis 
 
3.1 CO2 elements in registration taxes and feebate systems 
 
The energy efficiency and CO2 emission levels of cars will gradually improve as a result of 
the new regulation on CO2 emissions from cars (see section 2.2). The consumer preference to 
higher efficiency cars may also be enhanced through fiscal measures. This is actually part of 
the EU strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from cars (section 2.1). 
 
Fiscal measures may consist of introducing CO2 elements in registration and circulation taxes. 
This is actually already in place in some EU Member States (Table 2). 
 
A review of the structure of registration taxes in the different Member States reveals many 
different implemented options but a common feature is that they consist of increasing the 
relative price of the least environmentally-friendly cars in order to stimulate their substitution 
with more efficient ones. The differentiation can be made according to different criteria. In 
most cases, this is applied to new cars only. However, the system could also be applied to 
second-hand cars. In that case, criteria may have to be set per age segment. 
 
These systems and their environmental efficiency are discussed in the literature (e.g. Covec, 
2005)5. The advantages of such instruments on energy efficiency and CO2 emissions are 
generally acknowledged. Some perverse effects have also to be considered. 
 
As regards a differentiation of registration taxes according to the car energy efficiency or 
CO2 emission levels, the possible perverse effect is linked to the fact that new larger vehicles 
would, in practice, be made more expensive. This means that people who would anyway keep 
driving such big cars would tend to shift to the second-hand car market. This would also result 
in longer big car life (e.g. SUV), and consequently a lower fuel-efficiency big cars fleet. 
Furthermore, the evidence is weak in terms of a correlation between car purchases and 
taxation costs in European countries. 
 
In addition, a higher registration tax tends to be compensated by car retailers with lower 
purchase car prices (e.g. Denmark). This effect is enhanced by the lack of harmonization of 
registration taxes across EU because the lower purchase price in one country can be 
compensated for another country with a higher purchase price so that at the EU level the car 
manufacturers balance their profit margin. 
 
Amongst the various differentiated registration tax schemes, one case was recently introduced 
in several countries (e.g. France, Belgium), which is the Feebate system (or "bonus-malus" 
system). This system combines elements of both a fee (malus) and a rebate (bonus). The 
system is intended to be designed in such a way that the rebate which is granted for cleaner 
vehicles is financed by the fees imposed on less clean vehicles.  
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Table 2: Differentiated registration systems in place in several EU countries, including feebate 
systems (source: ACEA, 2008) 
Austria Belgium Cyprus Finland France Ireland Portugal Spain Sweden
Feebate system yes
'- Federal state 
tax: bonus for 
low emitting cars
- Additional 
Feebate system 
applicable in 
Walloon Region
yes no yes only malus component
only malus 
component
yes 
(0€ tax below 
pivot-point)
yes
Possible link with 
CO2 labelling no
yes (Feebate - 
Wallonia) yes no yes yes
not 
straightforward
yes no
Pivot point / 
neutral zone
120-180 g 
CO2/km
Federal state: 
115 g CO2/km
Walloon region: 
neutral zone 145 
to 195 g CO2/km
200 g CO2/km NR 130-160 g CO2/km NR NR 120 g CO2/km
120 g CO2/km 
(diesel, petrol, 
electric hybrid 
cars)
RK : cars driven 
with biofuels or 
electricity with 
consumption 
below certain 
levels also 
eligible
Character of tax 
function
-300 € below 120 
g/km
+25€ per g/km in 
excess to 180 
g/km
Federal state 
bonus: % of 
purchase price
Feebate system 
in Wallonia: 
discountinuous
discountinuous 
with malus levels 
as % of 
registration tax 
as defined by car 
cylinder classes
continuous 
function giving 
the % tax as a 
linear function of 
CO2 emissions 
(10% minimum, 
40% maximum)
discountinuous 
with fix 
bonus/malus 
levels
discountinuous 
continuous 
functions defined 
for each CO2 
emission class, 
specific for diesel 
and petrol cars
discountinuous one unique fix bonus
Absolute / Relative absolute absolute absolute absolute absolute absolute
Link with other 
pollutant
additional tax for 
particles (diesel 
cars)
no no no
diesel cars must 
have a particle 
filter or emit less 
than 0.005 g 
particles/km
Specific treatments
hybrid cars, E85, 
CNG, LPG, 
hydrogen, DPF
hybrid and 
electric cars
diesel cars with 
PM emissions 
< 0.005 g/km  
 
One element of the system is the so-called pivot point (or neutral zone) which is the CO2 
emission level (or emission range) below which a bonus is granted and above-which a malus 
is applied. As an example, the system in place in France is displayed in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of a feebate system (French case) 
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Several possibilities exist, even amongst the different feebate systems, covering the following 
features: 
• bonus/malus set as a continuous versus a discontinuous function of CO2 emissions 
• fixed levels versus levels proportionate to car parameters (e.g. car engine cylinder) 
• absolute / relative system 
• link with other pollutants (e.g. particles from diesel cars) 
• coexisting versus substituting pre-existing registration taxes 
• special cases (e.g. hybrid cars) 
• fleet coverage: new cars versus new cars and second hand cars 
 
Compared to the more traditional differentiated registration tax schemes, one may expect an 
enhancement of the price incentive to the most energy efficient cars with a feebate system. 
The pivot point can be set in accordance with the CO2 emission targets defined by the new 
regulation on CO2 emissions from cars (e.g. 130 g/km target). A discontinuous system could 
be coupled with the CO2 car labelling, especially when both systems are using a common CO2 
emissions classification (e.g. classes A, B, …, G.). In addition, the system may, in theory, be 
designed in such a way as to offer budget neutrality. However, existing examples show that 
this is uneasy to ex ante assess. Financial imbalance can not be excluded if the effects of the 
systems are not well anticipated. This was the unexpected experience in the US (Arizona) as 
described by Covec5. 
 
Simulations have also shown that feebates can deliver important emission reductions (BenDor 
et al., 2004)6. 
 
Given the potential synergy between the revised labelling of CO2 emissions of cars, the 
project concentrated on feebate systems. Feebate systems considered in this report have been 
extended to cases where the bonus part is removed. 
 
 
3.2 Early car retirement policy options 
 
In 2005, about 32% of the EU-25 car fleet was composed of cars older than 10 yearsa. These 
cars contribute disproportionately high to the total emissions from the European car fleet 
because, unlike new cars, they are equipped with obsolete air emissions abatement 
technologies and also because, over time, exhaust gas cleaning systems deteriorate. 
 
The decommissioning of these high-polluting cars can be accelerated if an incentive is granted 
to car owners who scrap their old car. This is the essence of the scrappage policy instrument. 
The instrument has already been implemented in several countries in the past, especially since 
the 1990s (see Table 3). In the EU, scrappage schemes were introduced in Greece, Hungary, 
Denmark, Spain, France, Ireland and Italy (ECMT, 1999)7. 
 
In many cases, the aim was to improve air quality. Further goals were the support of national 
car industry8. The recent initiatives in e.g France ("prime a la casse"), Spain (VIVA plan 
replacing the PREVIA plan) and Germany are, to a large extent, meant to meet the second 
objective. 
 
 
 
                                                 
a Based on TREMOVE data 
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Generally, two types of scrappage schemes exist: 
• A cash-for-scrappage policy option, under which the incentives available disregard the 
subsequent replacement car owner decision (thus including no replacement and/or 
buying a public transport pass). 
• A cash-for-replacement option, under which the incentive payment is conditional upon 
a specific kind of replacement vehicle being chosen (e.g. a new-model car). 
 
The possible types of scrappage schemes can differ in terms of duration (temporary or 
permanent scrappage schemes), eligibility criteria (e.g. old car age, characteristics of the new 
car), and subsidy level. 
 
These criteria might be set differently depending on the primary aim of the policy 
(improvement of air quality vs. support for the car industry, etc.). 
 
Table 3: Scrappage schemes implemented in Europe in the 1990s 
Country Period Requirement on the old car Cash for replacement Remarks 
Greece 01/1991 - 03/1993 >10 years  First Athens then whole country 
Hungary 09/1993 - … 2-stroke engine Yes 
First Budapest 
then whole country. 
Denmark 01/1994 - 06/1995 >10 years   
France 02/1994 - 06/1995 >10 years Yes  
 10/1995 - 09/1996 >8 years Yes  
Spain 04/1994 - 06/1995 >10 years Yes Permanent since 04/1997 
Ireland 06/1995 - 12/1997 >10 years Yes  
Norway 01/1996 >10 years   
Italy 01/1997 - 12/1997 >10 years Yes  
 02/1998 - 09/1998 >10 years Yes  
 10/1997 - … >10 years 
Yes 
(new car fuelled with LPG, 
natural gas or electricity) 
 
 
The environmental and economic impacts of the scrappage schemes are assessed in various 
literature sources. Indirect effects (environmental effects from car production and car 
disposal) are often neglected. Nevertheless, some interesting conclusions can be drawn: 
• Scrappage schemes are successful only if future cars emit considerably less than the 
old models, so that additional emissions from car manufacturing and End of Life are 
offset. This holds only partly true in the case of cash-for-scrappage (when a new car is 
bought from the incentive). 
• Unless the policy is permanent, the effects are temporary; car sales increase during the 
policy period. After the end of the period, car sales drop because the natural renewal 
rate of the fleet would replace the same old vehicles some years later. This is also 
reflected in the car fleet emission pathways. The observed emission reductions during 
the policy implementation period rapidly disappear after it is no longer in place. 
• As an age limit is generally introduced, some people tend to delay the envisaged 
scrappage. This may result in a drop in car sales and car scrappage, just before the 
start of the scrappage program.  
• Some people tend to buy a bigger car than the car they had before. They may also travel 
more with the new car (e.g. due to enhanced reliability, higher energy efficiency). 
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Regarding the environmental impacts, the effects differ between air quality and GHG 
emissions. Consensus emerges regarding the benefits with regards to air pollution. For GHG 
emissions, the actual effects are highly dependent on the detailed design of the scheme and of 
possible off-setting side effects (e.g. rebound effects). The effects reported consist in either 
slight decrease or increase of CO2 emissions. The expected energy efficiency leap between 
the old car scrapped and the new one and the timing of the policy instrument largely 
influences the outcome (ECMT, 1999)7. The effects of the additional manufactured cars (life-
cycle impacts)9,10, may also be significant and entail an increase of the life-cycle emissions. 
 
Other effects reported consist in higher road safety and impacts on car manufacturing 
industries (boosts of car sales). 
 
Equity concerns are often raised as the cash-for-replacement schemes might exclude people 
who can not afford to buy a new car, despite the incentive. This also means that the system 
would fail to cover a significant share of old cars. 
 
Early car retirement may also be achieved through alternative policy options, including car 
taxation (higher taxes on older/higher emitting cars) and Inspection/Maintenance (I/M) 
programmes. These alternatives can also be combined with scrappage policies (I/M 
programme and scrappage schemes are often mentioned). 
 
The design of a policy scheme (either a cash-for-replacement or a cash-for-scrappage) should 
imply to specify several criteria, including the duration of the instrument, the characteristics 
of the old cars (car age, air abatement standard, mileage) and the granted subsidy. These 
aspects are taken into account in this project (see section 7.2). 
 
Other criteria might be considered. One of them is the public concerned: the subsidy could be 
applicable to anybody who disposes an old car or, alternatively, based on some criteria, for 
instance income. Such options were not assessed in this project. 
 
 
3.3 Feebate system combined with scrappage schemes 
 
The above discussion about the strengths and possible limitations of the feebate and the early 
car retirement policy options suggest that these limitations may be reduced if they are 
combined together: 
• The perverse effect of differentiated registration (or circulation) taxes and of feebate 
systems on the second-hand car market could be reduced if the scheme is coupled with 
an incentive to an earlier old car retirement. 
• On the other hand, the expected effects of the early car retirement policy in terms of 
accelerated clean technology penetration would be greater – especially regarding CO2 
emission reductions and fuel economy, if there is a reinforced incentive to buy the 
cleanest cars.  
 
The combined schemes analyzed in this study link a feebate system (bonus-malus) with a car-
for replacement policy. 
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4 Methodology 
 
4.1 General approach 
 
This report analyses the environmental and economic impacts of the selected policy options 
and also the potentials of car lightweighting. To this end, a methodology was designed 
combining and applying different analytical tools with a view to developing a comprehensive 
assessment of the policy options, i.e. considering the EU27 car fleet. Comprehensiveness also 
meant including all direct and indirect impacts: 
• Regarding the environmental impacts, all major impacts had to be covered, especially 
those associated with the fuel cycle (so-called Well-to-wheel impacts) and those from 
the production of the materials involved in the car and spare parts manufacturing. The 
car disposal is also considered. 
• Regarding the economic impacts, both impacts on the consumer and on the industry 
(automotive sector and supplying sectors) are analysed. 
 
The methodological approach combined different analytical tools (see Figure 2): 
1. The TREMOVE model which is a policy assessment model, designed to study the 
effects of different transport and environment policies on the European transport sector 
(see section 4.2). 
2. A database containing information about the car composition of ELVs and spare car 
parts in the EU27. This was built into the framework of the project. 
3. The Input-Output tables that are being developed by IPTS for the EU27 have been used 
to analyse the impacts of policy options on the overall economy (see section 4.5). 
4. A life-cycle assessment calculation module built upon the IMPRO-car project1, 
especially where the environmental impacts associated with material extraction and 
processing were concerned. 
 
Figure 2: General methodology 
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The TREMOVE model was the core of the project, producing the outputs needed for the other 
modeling components (Input-Output tables and life-cycle assessment module). The materials 
module was constructed as a new TREMOVE module, receiving input from the existing 
TREMOVE modules, especially on total vehicle stock by age, technology and mileages. The 
new materials module was fed by the ELVs database to include detailed material composition. 
 
The following section details each of the components. 
 
 
4.2 TREMOVE model 
 
TREMOVE is a policy assessment model for studying the effects of different transport and 
environmental policies on the emissions of the transport sector. The model estimates the 
transport demand, the modal shifts, the vehicle stock renewal, the emissions of air pollutants 
and the welfare level. The model can be applied for environmental and economic analysis of 
different policies such as road pricing, public transport pricing, emission standards, subsidies 
for cleaner cars etc. TREMOVE models both passenger and freight transport, and covers the 
period 1995 - 2030. 
 
The model consists of 31 parallel country models, each of them consisting of three inter-
linked modules: a transport demand module, a vehicle turnover module and an emission and 
fuel consumption module. This study used the EU27 country models. 
 
The transport demand module describes transport flows and the users’ decision-making 
process in terms of modal choice. Starting from the baseline level of demand for passengers 
and freight transport per mode, period, region etc., the module describes how the 
implementation of a policy measure will affect the choice of the users and of the companies 
between the different transport modes. The key assumption is that the choices are made based 
on the generalized price for each mode: cost, taxes or subsidy and time cost per kilometre 
travelled. The output of the demand module consists of passenger kilometres (pkm) and ton 
kilometres (tkm) that are demanded per transport type for a given policy environment. The 
pkm and tkm are then converted into vehicle kilometres (vkm). 
 
The vehicle stock turnover module describes how changes in demand for transport or 
changes in vehicle price structure influence the share in the stock by age and vehicle type. The 
output of the vehicle stock module is twofold: total fleet and the number of km for each year 
according to vehicle type and age. 
 
The fuel consumption and emissions module calculates fuel consumption and emissions, 
based on the structure of the vehicle stock, the number of kms driven by each vehicle type, 
and the driving conditions. 
 
Outputs from the vehicle stock and fuel consumptions and emissions modules are fed back 
into the demand module. As fuel consumption, stock structure and usage influence usage 
costs, they are important determinants of transport demand and modal split. 
 
In addition to the three core modules, the TREMOVE model includes a well-to-tank 
emissions and a welfare cost module. The well-to-tank emissions module calculates the 
emissions during the production of fuels and electricity. 
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The welfare cost module enables a calculation of the cost to society associated with emission 
reduction scenarios in European urban and non-urban areas. The welfare effect of a policy 
change is calculated as the discounted sum of changes in utility of households, production 
costs, external costs of congestion and pollution and benefits of tax recycling. These benefits 
of tax recycling represent the welfare effect of avoiding public funds being collected from 
other sectors, when the transport sector generates more revenues. 
 
An overview map can be found in Figure 3. More details are given by De Ceuster et al. 
(2007)11 
 
The TREMOVE model baseline considered in this project is described in chapter 5. 
 
Figure 3: TREMOVE model structure 
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4.3 Material flows 
 
Developing a comprehensive picture of the environmental implications of the policy options 
(e.g. considering consequences on the car production, spare parts and car disposal) implies to 
estimating the flows of material involved. As TREMOVE did not incorporate such 
information, the project built an additional module to the model, incorporating total material 
volumes per material type associated with: 
• The passenger vehicle production, per material type. 
• The passenger vehicle usage phase, including spare parts per material type. 
• The end-of-life vehicles (ELV). 
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Relevant information was collected from the literature and available databases, and then 
combined into a new database. A new output module was created for TREMOVE, linking 
both to the initial output database (see section 4.2) and the new materials database. In 
particular, the TREMOVE primary output delivers data on car sales and car scrappage (as 
given by year and mileage) which have been linked to the average material composition of 
corresponding cars. These outputs are also linked to the composition and usage rate (e.g. 
number of tyres per km driven). Specificities of vehicle features (e.g. age, size) influencing 
the material composition were taken into account. The new materials modulea enables a 
calculation of the different material flows and can subsequently be used to calculate the 
associated environmental impacts (see section 4.4). 
 
The key development stages for the material flow database were to: 
• Determine the average weight and material composition of average cars for three engine 
size categories differentiated by emission standard and engine type (technical progress). 
• Quantify material flows generated by the disposal of ELVs. 
• Identify the relevant spare parts and their average weight, material composition, average 
lifetime, and quantify the material flows generated by their dismantling and disposal. 
 
 
4.3.1 Car composition 
 
4.3.1.1 Materials and vehicle categories 
 
The characterization of car composition started with a material list taken from the IMPRO car 
project and further extended with new materials known to be involved in innovative car 
technologies (e.g. advanced lightweight materials). 
 
The database includes ferrous metals (iron, steel, high-strength steel), non-ferrous metals 
(aluminum, copper, lead, zinc, magnesium, platinum, palladium, rhodium), plastics (PP, PE, 
PA, PVC, ABS, PUR, PET), oil, refrigerant, glass, textiles, rubber and composite materials.  
The vehicle categories represented in TREMOVE have been considered, thus including a 
differentiation with respect to fuels (diesel and petrol), engine size (small, medium and large), 
emission standards (Euro1 to Euro6 and pre-Euro1). The differentiation also included four 
energy efficiency levels for Euro5 and Euro6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a The additional module is conceived as pure post-processing of a TREMOVE run. This gives considerable advantages with 
respect to runtime and flexibility. 
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4.3.1.2 Vehicle weight 
 
The literature indicates a steady increase in curb weight (CW) over recent decades. As an 
example, over the period 1976 to 2002, the CW of the VW Golf has increased from from 885 
kg to 1343 kg. ACEA reports an average weight increase of 1.5%/yr (in (Perlo 2008)12). 
 
This figure was used to assign weight values for the pre-Euro to Euro 4 passenger cars. The 
weight for Euro 5 and Euro 6 cars was assumed to be equal to the Euro 4 cars (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Curb weight of pre-Euro to Euro 6 passenger cars (kg) 
 Petrol Diesel 
 small medium large small medium large 
Pre-Euro 1 780 1 014 1 182 872 1 100 1 385 
Euro 1 828 1 076 1 255 925 1 168 1 470 
Euro 2 879 1 142 1 332 982 1 239 1 560 
Euro 3 933 1 213 1 413 1 042 1 315 1 655 
Euro 4 to Euro6 990 1 287 1 500 1 106 1 396 1 757 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Reference vehicle (Euro 4) 
 
The Euro 4 cars (current new car) have been used as a first reference vehicle for which the 
material composition was derived from an analysis of: 
• Available information on recent passenger cars of different European car manufacturers 
which cover the respective vehicle categories. For instance, product declarations 
published by the automotive industry have been considered.  
• Other relevant studies providing data on the share of materials: An overview is given in 
Figure 4 for petrol cars of three car sizes.  
 
The literature suggests a shift from steel to aluminium when moving from small to larger 
vehicles. However, the share of glass and fluids increases as vehicle size increases.  
In general, diesel cars tend to show a higher share of iron and aluminium because of the 
higher average weight of the diesel engine. The vastt majority of the remaining materials vary 
little or remain at a constant level (in terms of relative shares, within the vehicle size 
categories). 
 
Data collected amongst the literature were comparable only at a certain level of material 
aggregation, namely, for the following groups of materials: ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
light metals, lead, plastics, rubber, glass/ceramic and fluids. For key material categories a 
further breakdown was carried out using selected data in greater detail so that information 
about each material could be incorporated into the car database. An example of the final 
material composition for the reference vehicles is shown in Table 5. 
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Figure 4: Overview of relevant studies on (petrol) passenger cars and the reference petrol vehicles 
for three size categories 
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Table 5: Material composition (%) of average small, medium and big Euro 4 petrol and diesel cars 
Vehicle size Small Medium Big 
Engine petrol diesel petrol diesel petrol diesel 
Materials       
Iron 9.6 10.5 9.5 10.4 9.4 10.3 
Steel 43.2 43.1 40.9 40.8 39.2 39.3 
High-strength steels 9.8 9.5 9.8 9.5 9.6 9.3 
Copper 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Zinc 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
PGM Pt 0.00006 0.00019 0.00005 0.00034 0.00003 0.00049 
PGM Pd 0.00010 0.00000 0.00022 0.00000 0.00032 0.00000 
PGM Rh 0.00003 0.00000 0.00004 0.00000 0.00004 0.00000 
Lead 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Aluminium 7.1 7.5 9.0 9.3 9.8 10.1 
Magnesium 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Other metals 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
PP 9.1 8.9 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.5 
PE 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 
PA 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
PVC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ABS 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
PUR 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.5 
PET 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Other plastics 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Rubber/ Elastomer 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 
Oil 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Refrigerant 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Other fluids 1.7 2.1 2.6 1.7 2.0 2.5 
Glass 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 
Textile 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Other 2.8 2.7 3.0 2.9 3.5 3.4 
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4.3.1.4 Pre-Euro4 vehicles 
 
The material composition of average (pre Euro 1, Euro 1 to Euro 3) passenger cars was 
derived from additional analysis. The composition was evaluated for the year in which the 
corresponding emission standard was introduced, starting with Euro 1 in 1992. The pre-Euro1 
vehicles were evaluated in 1988. On the basis of the Euro 4 reference vehicles, the material 
composition and vehicle weight of pre-Euro 4 cars have been calculated, taking into account 
the trends of the previous time period (see section 4.3.1.1). 
 
The material composition of pre-Euro 4 cars is mainly derived from the key materials of 
petrol and diesel passenger cars assumed in INFRA (2002)13. The resulting shares have been 
compared to the composition of the reference Euro 4 vehicles (petrol and diesel). The relative 
deviation was then used to determine the final material composition of pre-Euro 4 vehicles for 
each size category. In accordance with the approach used for Euro 4 vehicles, the material 
composition of pre-Euro 4 vehicles is also differentiated by fuel type (petrol and diesel). As 
INFRA did consider the same material differentiation, further assumptions have been made: 
• the increasing use of magnesium and HSS is correlated to the changing share of 
aluminium; 
• the shares of other fluids, glass and textiles are kept constant over time. An exception is 
made for refrigerants which are assumed to increase over time with the increasing 
penetration rate of mobile air conditioning systems; 
• the use of PET is correlated to that of PE; 
• the use of lead is related to the slight decrease of the battery weight over time; 
• the platinum group of metals (PGM) loading is derived from (Umicore 2008)14, for each 
vehicle type but small diesel cars. In this case, the data for medium diesel cars was used 
and rescaled according to the specific vehicle curb weight. 
 
Overall, the following key trends can be stated when moving from pre-Euro 1 to Euro 4 cars: 
• the shares of conventional steel and iron slightly decrease; 
• the share of lightweight materials such as aluminium, magnesium and HSS increases; 
• the share of plastics increases globally; while the share of PP, PE and ABS increases, 
PVC and PA decreases and the share of PUR and PET remains almost constant, 
• the share of all other materials does not show any significant changes compared to the 
Euro 4 reference vehicle. 
 
 
4.3.1.5 Post Euro 4 vehicles 
 
The car database was expanded to Euro 5 and Euro 6 cars. The baseline configuration (curb 
weight, material composition) of Euro 5 and 6 passenger cars is similar to the Euro 4 vehicles. 
Only the PGM load of the catalytic converter and the amount of refrigerant are adapted 
individually for each vehicle type (diesel/petrol cars, small, medium, big, Euro 5/Euro 6) 
based on data taken from (Umicore 2008)14 and based on the estimated penetration rate of air-
conditioning systems assumed in TREMOVE. 
 
Because the Euro 5 and Euro 6 baseline vehicles in the different policy scenarios involve 
additional fuel efficiency enhancement technology packages, the impact of future fuel-
efficiency technologies on the material composition was evaluated and, where relevant, these 
impacts have been quantified for future Euro 5 and 6 passenger cars. As a result, their original 
material composition was modified accordingly. 
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Four different fuel efficiency levels have been determined for diesel and petrol cars, in 
accordance with the analysis which had been used as a background for the impact assessment 
of the regulation on CO2 emissions from cars (TNO/IEEP/LAT, 2006)15. For diesel cars, this 
includes the baseline stage and 10%, 20%, 30% reduction (compared to baseline). For petrol 
cars, baseline stage and 15%, 30%, 40% reductions (compared to baseline). This takes into 
account of the fact that the fuel efficiency improvement potential is the greater for petrol cars. 
For these four CO2 emission levels, technology packages have been defined and the 
respective material changes have been included in the database. The approach includes an 
interpolation between these efficiency levels so that the model can reflect the material 
changes entailed by the efficiency progress. 
 
This approach is based on the statistical approach used in TNO et al. (2006). A rough estimate 
determined the technologies which are most likely to be used in the future to improve 
efficiency and which will affect the material composition. This was based on the 
combinations of technologies specified in the IMPRO-car study. 
 
In light of the regulation about CO2 emissions from cars, the modified technology packages 
do not include vehicle weight reduction. The following provides that main changes that the 
most representative technology improvements would entail: 
• Engine downsizing is expected to induce a decrease of material demand of the engine. 
• Improved aerodynamics (modified vehicle’s shape and height) does not have a relevant 
impact on the material demand. Further measures such as the installation of fairings and 
spoilers would however require a modified material demand. 
• The hybrid propulsion system leads to a considerable modification in major car 
components such as the integration of a more powerful energy storage system, an 
electric motor and related electronics as well as a downsizing of the conventional 
combustion engine. The main material impact is induced by the energy storage system; 
in the car database the NiMH battery technology is assumed to be generally applied in 
the case of mild and full hybrid cars.  
 
 
4.3.2 Spare parts  
 
The key car components that are usually replaced during the vehicle’s life have been 
documented separately in the car database (material composition and replacement rate for 
every vehicle category). Spare parts identified to have a relevant impact on the material 
demand during the life-cycle of passenger cars include tyres, starter batteries, catalytic 
converters, refrigerants and engine oil. While the replacement rate depends on the spare part 
and on the average driving pattern, the weight of the materials was adjusted to the curb weight 
of the specific vehicle category (in terms of their absolute weight) without changing the share 
of materials. The key information with regard to automotive spare parts was based on a 
literature review and expanded through a survey of practising experts from several car repair 
garages who reported on their current practice. 
 
4.3.3 End-of-life vehicles 
 
The development of the treatment of ELVs in the EU27 is shaped by regulatory, economical 
and technological aspects. In order to forecast the material flows of ELVs in Europe, all three 
aspects have been qualitatively assessed and a set of assumptions was elaborated. 
 
The regulatory aspects relate to the implementation of the ELV Directive (2000/53/EC) 
including the 80% and 85% recycling rates for 2006 and 2015 respectively, restrictions 
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regarding landfill waste deposition, and the somewhat delayed implementation of EU law in 
new Member States. In terms of the economic aspects, ELV exports outside of Europe, 
increasing costs for landfills and the increased values for particular recycling streams (e.g. 
copper, advanced materials) have been considered. 
 
Technologically, ELVs are treated in a tiered process, including de-pollution (removal of 
hazardous materials, as required by the ELV Directive), dismantling, and shredding. The the 
shredder process output include an iron-fraction, a heavy fraction (mainly non-ferrous metals) 
and automotive shredder residue (ASR). Advanced post shredder technologies are currently 
being developed and implemented in response to the current and forthcoming restrictions 
regarding landfilling ASR and the increasing share of high value materials in the ASR. 
 
The following assumptions constitute the basis for the elaboration of a ‘best-case’ and 
‘pessimistic case’ scenarios: 
 
• 2008-2012, the pressure to further treat shredder residue is low (although it is 
increasing). Consigning shredder residue to landfilsl remains the most common and the 
cheapest option. Approximately 90% of the ASR is deposited in landfills.  
• By 2016 a larger share of ELV vehicles will remain in the countries of origin. More 
large-scale shredders will be operating inside the EU 27, creating a critical mass to more 
deeply treat shredder residue. Furthermore, landfills in Eastern Europe will have 
become more expensive. However, newly created treatment capacities will have to cope 
with increasing the total amounts of ELV, limiting the extent of their treatment. 
◦ In the best case nearly 40% of the ASR will be mechanically treated and the 
output fractions will be used materially and energetically. The dismantling and 
material recycling of plastics will be temporarily expanded. 
◦ In the pessimistic case 20% of ASR will be mechanically treated.  
• By 2025 the increased use of high-strength steel (HSS), aluminum and plastics will have 
reached the ELV vehicles. The higher values of materials and material scarcity will 
create more incentives for recovering materials. A larger share of ELV remains in the 
countries of origin; newly created treatment capacity will have to cope with increasing 
total amounts of ELV, limiting the depth of treatment. 
◦ In the best case 80% of the ASR will be mechanically separated with further 
recycling of individual fractions.  
◦ In the pessimistic case 40% of the shredder residues will be mechanically 
separated with further recycling of individual fractions. 
• By 2030 the trends will have continued while the overall recovery rate for vehicles will 
further increase. 
◦ In the best case about 85% of the shredder residues will be mechanically separated 
with further recycling of individual fractions. 15% of ASR will still be landfilled.  
◦ In the pessimistic case 50% of the shredder residues will be mechanically 
separated and 50% landfilled.  
In the best-case scenario, the recovery and recycling requirements of the ELV Directive will 
only be met across the EU27 by 2025. A third scenario was created that follows the ELV 
Directive in the EU27 as a precondition. As a result, this scenario requires much deeper 
dismantling rates followed by the recycling of plastics and ferrous metals until 2020. 
 
The percentage distribution of each vehicle material in terms of the different waste treatment 
was defined for ELV for 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020, 2025 and 2030. The percentage distribution 
linked with the ELV input results in the ELV material flows. 
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4.4 Indirect environmental impacts 
 
The TREMOVE model calculates the well-to-wheel (WTW) emissions. In order to build a 
more complete picture of the major life-cycle impacts of the car fleet, the environmental 
impacts from the production of cars and of spare parts have been calculated by using the 
output results from TREMOVE on material flows which were subjected to life-cycle analysis. 
 
The calculation was based on the tool built and the data used in the IMPRO-car project, 
implementing the well established life-cycle approach. All industrial or economic activities 
directly or indirectly linked to the production of cars and spare parts were included. The 
environmental impacts were expressed in terms of aggregated midpoint indicators (e.g. t CO2-
equivalents for climate change), using the CML 2001 methodology (CML, 2001)16. The 
following impact categories (midpoint indicators) have been considered: 
• Abiotic depletion (excluding primary energy depletion)(AD) 
• Global warming potential (GHG) 
• Photochemical ozone creation potential (POCP) 
• Acidification potential (AP) 
• Eutrophication potential (EP) 
• Bulk waste (BW) 
 
The life-cycle data for the extraction and processing of raw materials, and material production 
have been mainly taken from the Ecoinvent database (Frischknecht et al., 2004)17, selecting 
Western Europe representative processes. Table 5 shows the material considered. 
 
 
4.5 Input-output tables 
 
This report quantifies the macroeconomic effects on employment and value added of different 
policy scenarios at EU27 level. The methodology is described in the following sections. 
 
 
4.5.1 Input-output methodology 
 
An input-output matrix of technical coefficients, A = (aij) where i, j = 1, …, n (where n is the 
number of commodities), represents the direct requirements of commodity i needed to 
produce a physical unit of commodity j. For instance, if industry 1 corresponds to agriculture 
and industry 2 corresponds to chemicals, then a21 will be the amount of chemical products 
consumed by agriculture per physical unit of peaches, apples and so on (ten Raa and Rueda-
Cantuche, 2003)18. In more general terms, the standard reference is Leontief (1986)19. 
The matrix of technical coefficients A has been used for economic analysis by means of the 
so-called quantity equation or material balance: x = Ax + y. Vector x denotes total output of 
commodities while vector Ax reflects the requirements for intermediates and vector y 
represents the exogenous aggregate final demand. This equality makes total supply to match 
with total use of commodities. 
 
The quantity equation is used for national or regional economic planning; for instance, the 
output requirements to satisfy a certain final demand level could be analysed. Thus, there will 
be a direct effect over the output levels, which will depend on the final demand variations (y) 
and additional indirect effects that will be determined by the A-matrix, in accordance with the 
material balance equation (ten Raa and Rueda-Cantuche, 2003)18. 
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Input-output analysis has frequently been used to analyse impact of final demand on total 
output. Furthermore, the input-output system allows also evaluating the direct and indirect 
impact of economic policies on other economic variables such as labour, capital, energy and 
emissions, by using the appropriate extensions (Eurostat, 2008)20. Most of these policies have 
to be analysed with macroeconomic models which provide a minimum of sectoral 
disaggregation. From the quantity equation, we could derive that x = (I - A)-1y and sub-
sequently, the following extension will offer multiple approaches for analysis: z = B(I - A)-1y 
(central input-output equation system). 
 
Matrix B includes the input coefficients of the selected variables for the analysis (e.g. 
intermediates, labour, capital, energy, emissions) and vector z shows the direct and indirect 
requirements (e.g. energy, labour, capital) or joint products (emissions) for the produced 
goods and services (Eurostat, 2008)20. Within this framework, the use of input-output systems 
is generally and often applied in the literature to evaluate environmental and employment 
policies, to productivity analysis, to energy issues, and so on. 
 
On the other hand, the main limitations of the standard input-output methodology are in its 
lack of micro-economic foundations and in being used as a purely top-down model. However, 
the IO study presented in this technical report establishes a link to TREMOVE. Under the 
policy scenarios considered in this report, TREMOVE-based outputs have been used as input 
parameters for the macroeconomic assessment, including the demand for new cars and spare 
parts, the demand for fuels, the demand for insurance and repair services as well as the tax 
revenues gained by the public sector (e.g. purchase taxes, fuel tax, VAT on servicing). These 
specific outcomes allow to account for the policy-related changes caused in households' 
consumption and therefore, in final demand. Eventually, the quantity equation and the central 
input-output equation system (including a technical coefficients matrix) provide the output 
multipliers and the employment and value added effects. 
 
 
4.5.2 Data availability 
 
Since some of the environmental policy scenarios considered in this report refers to the future 
(mainly 2010-2015), we constructed a matrix of technical coefficients for the year 2015. With 
this purpose, we took as a starting point the consolidated EU27 symmetric input-output table 
(SIOT) of the year 2000 (Rueda-Cantuche et al., 2009)21, which was compiled by IPTS. 
 
This SIOT consists of 59 industries and 59 commodities (NACE-2 digits), to which two 
additional rows and columns were added, i.e. automotive fuel and manufacturing of passenger 
cars, which were disaggregated from the petroleum refining sector (NACE-23) and the 
manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (NACE-34), respectively. For the 
disaggregation of the former, we used the standard EU27 SIOT which includes a matrix of 
imports (Rueda-Cantuche et al., 2009)21, data from the GTAP databasea and existing 
information from a biofuels study (Neuwahl et al., 2008)22. For the splitting of the latter, we 
used the so-called ’Intermediate consolidated sector tables (104 sectors)’ published by the 
Japanese Statistics Bureaub (which includes a disaggregated sector of passenger motor car 
production) together with TREMOVE results on household consumption of passenger cars 
and the already mentioned EU27 SIOT. Since the motor vehicles purchased by industries are 
recorded as capital formation and not as intermediate inputs, the total output of passenger cars 
                                                 
a See: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/  
b See: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/io/2000/zuhyou/sec104.xls 
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was assumed to be consumed only by final demand agents (households, government and gross 
fixed capital formation) rather than as intermediate use. 
 
Once the new SIOT was constructed with 61 industries and 61 commodities, we used a 
refined version of the Euro method (Eurostat, 2008)20 to update the current EU27 SIOT up to 
2015. The Euro method pivots on three types of data inputs to be effectively implemented, i.e. 
growth rates of value added by sector; growth rates of import uses by sector; and growth rates 
of final demand by sector. 
 
a) Value added growth rates: for the sake of consistency, they have been aligned with the 
background economic growth in TREMOVE which were based on the PRIMES modela and 
detailed in (EC, 2005)23. The breakdown of these rates was not detailed enough and the 
augmented EU27 SIOT had to be aggregated accordingly to 19 industries and 19 
commodities. 
 
b) Import growth rates: the Euro method was refined by identifying individual import growth 
rates by sector (and not a single growth rate for all) using econometric time series analysis 
(Gujarati, 2003)24 to forecast both volumes and prices of import commodities (goods and 
services separately) in 2015. Data on external trade of goods (in monetary and volume values) 
came from the Eurostat database ComExtb while the EU27 Balance of Paymentsc provided 
external trade on services though only in monetary values. For goods, we disposed of monthly 
data from 1999 to 2008 and for services, of quarterly data from 2004 to 2008. 
 
c) Final demand growth rates: first, the Ghosh price model (Dietzenbacher, 1997)25 was used 
to estimate the new total output values, which must be consistent with the already estimated 
import and value added growth rates. Next, final demand values were obtained by keeping 
constant the shares of intermediate consumption over total use of commodities. 
 
 
4.5.3 Link to TREMOVE and modelling 
 
Once we have projected the EU27 SIOT for 2015 (and therefore, a technical coefficients 
matrix for the same year), we mapped the TREMOVE expected changes in households' 
demand for each one of the policy scenarios considered into the NACE categories of the final 
demand vector of the EU27 SIOT for 2015. In addition, the EUKLEMSd data on labour were 
used to address employment impact analysis through the central input-output equation system 
and finally, we assumed that tax revenues obtained from each of the policy options are re-
distributed again to households in order to keep the government budget unchanged. 
Otherwise, that would result in undesirable distorted welfare effects. 
 
                                                 
a The 3.0 TREMOVE version is calibrated in consistency with macro-economic projections used in the PRIMES model. This 
doesn’t include any assumption about growth annual rates of sectoral final demand nor growth annual rates of total imports. 
Only growth annual rates of total final consumption of households and of GDP (market prices) are available 
b See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/  
c See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/  
d See: www.euklems.net  
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5 Basecase scenario and lightweight variant 
 
5.1 Central Basecase  
 
This chapter describes the TREMOVE baseline applied for the scenario policy simulations. It 
describes the most important assumptions relevant for the specific simulations. Also, some 
TREMOVE input data was revised and, where needed, were updated. 
 
 
5.1.1 Assumptions and data update 
 
The TREMOVE version 3.1 was used. This version is based on the version constructed in the 
FP6 I-TREN projecta. The most important features of the baseline are as follows: 
• CO2-emissions: the assumptions about the evolution of car emissions have been aligned 
to those used in the impact assessment of the regulation on CO2 emissions from cars 
(EC, 2007)26, namely assuming a CO2 emission level of 160 g/km in 2006 and no 
further decrease for future years and no autonomous mass increase. 
• Abatement technologies: EURO5 & 6 are included in the baseline.  
 
Some tax data have been updated. Both policy simulations would indeed (directly or 
indirectly) relate to registration. Research by (Kunert, 2007)27 and the ACEA tax guide 
(ACEA, 2007)28 provide recent data about registration taxes. Where inconsistencies were 
detected in TREMOVE, data were updated. This was mainly the case for New Member 
States. It is worth noting that registration tax values differ significantly between countries, e.g. 
DK has a registration tax which is, on average, almost equal to the purchase cost while others 
have no registration tax at all (e.g. DE, FR). The tax structure can also vary significantly: 
some countries apply a registration tax flat rate whereas others apply a differentiated 
registration tax (e.g. a function of vehicle cost or engine size). Some countries partly use 
differentiated CO2-registration tax (like NL, see also section 3.1). In these cases, an average 
was set as input. Ownership taxes were also updated for some countries. 
 
 
5.1.2 Stock 
 
This section describes the projection on car stock: penetration of new technologies, i.e. Euro-
standard compliant vehicles, trends in diesel/gasoline, share and stock breakdown by vehicle 
size class. Differences between countries are also discussed. 
 
Figure 5 shows the continuous increase of the total passenger vehicle stock over time, due to 
increasing demand. In the period 1995-2010 emission standards are imposed on new sold 
vehicles. With a gradual fleet renewal, these new environmentally friendly vehicles become 
more common in the vehicle fleet. Note that, even without policy, in 2025 almost all vehicles 
in EU27 will be at least Euro5 compliant. 
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the diesel share in the EU27 fleet. The diesel share has been 
increasing since the nineties and continues to increase until about 2015. Later, the share 
remains stable (40%). This increase is due to the substantial improvements in terms of 
performance of diesel cars that will become more attractive for consumers. The increasing 
                                                 
a http://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/projects/itren-2030/ 
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diesel share is mostly visible for medium-sized diesel cars, at the cost of medium petrol cars. 
Overall for EU27, a shift from small to medium engine-size is expected. 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of passenger vehicle stock by emission standard (1995-2030 – EU27) 
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Figure 6: Evolution of passenger vehicle type share, CNG & LPG excluded (1995 - 2030 – EU27)  
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
St
oc
k 
(1
06
 v
eh
ic
le
s) PCGB
PCGM
PCGS
PCDB
PCDM
PCDS
 
 
The variation of stock composition between countries is important. Figure 7 shows the diesel-
gasoline share expected in 2010 for each country. Large variations are observed; e.g. BE and 
LU hold large diesel shares over 50%, while others such as GR, SE, EE have diesel shares 
lower then 10%. This shows that the policy impact can differ significantly between countries. 
 
 
Figure 7: Passenger vehicle stock diesel (blue) – petrol (purple) share in EU27 countries in 2010 
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5.1.3 Demand 
 
Passenger vehicle transport demand has been increasing and is expected to keep increasing. 
This is also reflected in the TREMOVE baseline (Figure 8). The breakdown of demand per 
vehicle type is similar to the vehicle stock composition. 
 
Figure 8: Evolution of passenger vehicle transport demand, by vehicle type (1995 - 2030 – EU27) 
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 2023 2027
vkm (billion)
PCGB
PCGM
PCGS
PCDB
PCDM
PCDS
 
 
The generalized price of passenger transport is determined by various cost components. 
Figure 9 gives the overview of cost components. Purchase cost and repair cost are the most 
important cost components and take half of the total cost. Registration tax holds only a small 
share in the basecase (1.5%). Total fuel cost (half resource cost half tax), holds a share of 
about 20%. Note that the share remains stable over time. The only (small) shift is from total 
fuel cost to purchase cost. This reflects a shift from running cost to investment cost, trading 
fuel cost for abatement cost. 
 
Figure 9: Share of passenger vehicle costs for the consumer by cost component (2005-2030 – EU27) 
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5.1.4 Well-to-Wheel Emissions 
 
CO2 emissions increase over time due to increasing demand and despite the continuous fuel 
efficiency improvements. In contrast, NOx emissions strongly decrease, due to Euro emission 
standards introduced since the nineties which are increasingly more stringent. NOx emissions 
are a good illustration for other regulated pollutants like particulate matters (PM) and volatile 
organic compounds (VOC). The reduction levels can vary depending on the emission gap 
between pre-Euro and Euro standards. 
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Figure 10:  Evolution of CO2 and NOx emissions of passenger vehicles in EU27 (1995 - 2030) 
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5.1.5 Material flows and associated impacts 
 
The following section presents the material flows estimated by the new TREMOVE material 
module (see Section 4.3). Then, the life-cycle impacts are presented. 
 
 
5.1.5.1 Material flows due to the production and EOL of cars 
 
The total material flows due to the production of cars for the basecase are shown in Figure 11 
for the years 2010 to 2030. The materials included in the analysis (Table 5) have been in part 
regrouped for the sake of clarity. Material flows show an increase of about 34% between 2010 
and 2030. This increase follows the trend in transport demand (see section 5.1.3) and vehicle 
stock (see section 5.1.2). The total material flows do not show a constant increase over the 
years due to the shift to other car categories or fuel type (Figure 6), but also new technologies 
(Euro standards). 
 
Figure 11: Material flows due to the production of new cars according to materials 
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Total material flows due to the EOL of cars for the basecase are depicted in Figure 12. 
Materials have been again regrouped as in the case of new cars production. Material flows 
due to EOL show a more pronounced increase between 2010 and 2030. This can be explained 
by increases in the average car weight in the past. This also explains why total material flows 
due to EOL vehicles are always smaller than those that are due to car production. 
 
The shares of HSS, aluminium and plastics increase over time (from 1.4% to 9.4%, 6.6% to 
8.7%, and 16.8% to 19.1%, respectively) while the shares of conventional steel and iron 
decrease. 
 
Figure 12: Material flows due to the EOL of cars according to materials 
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5.1.5.2 Material flows due to the production and EOL of spare parts 
 
For the basecase, the material flows due to spare parts production and EOL of spare parts do 
not differ (every spare part that is disposed of is replaced by a new one). 
 
In Figure 13, the material flows for the different spare parts are shown. Figure 14 depicts the 
material flows according to materials. Material flows due to spare parts show a steady 
increase from 2.84 Mt in 2010 to 3.75 Mt in 2030 (34% increase). Compared to the material 
flows due to the production and EOL of new cars, spare parts are of minor relevance (12% to 
13%). Tyres clearly dominate the material flows, followed by batteries and engine oil (about 
64%, 19% and 16%, respectively). Refrigerants and catalysts play a minor role. 
 
Regarding the different materials, the main fraction is plastics (about 32%) which include 
rubbers/elastomer from tyres and plastics from batteries (Figure 14). Other materials (26%) 
stem from tyres (e.g. carbon black, additives), batteries (e.g. sulphuric acid), and catalysts. 
Engine oil represents 16% of the material flows and 11% is due to lead from batteries. 
Textiles and refrigerants are of minor importance. 
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Figure 13: Material flows due to the production/EOL of spare parts according to spare part 
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Figure 14: Material flows due to the production/EOL of spare parts according to materials 
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5.1.5.3 EOL material flows according to waste treatment technology 
 
The material module allows for the determination of EOL material flows according to waste 
treatment technology. For ELVs, the shares of the single treatment technologies have been 
assumed for the ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ scenarios (Figure 15) as described in section 
4.3.3). The main differences are higher ASR treatment and subsequent material end energy 
recovery shares (ASR secondary recycling) and less landfilling (ASR disposal) in the 
‘optimistic’ scenario compared to the ‘pessimistic’ scenario (see Section 4.3.3). 
 
The different treatment technologies for EOL of spare parts are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Treatment technologies for EOL of spare parts 
Spare part Treatment technology 
Battery Plastic recycling (energy and material recovery) 
 Lead recovery 
Tyre Reuse 
 Refurbishment 
 Energy recovery 
 Material recovery 
 Landfilling 
 Export 
Catalyst Recycling 
Engine oil Refurbishment 
 Energy recovery 
 Hazardous waste incineration 
Refrigerant Refrigerants recycling 
 
Figure 15: Material flows due to the EOL of cars according to treatment technology 
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Total material flows according to treatment technologies are shown in Figure 16. Material 
recovery (of tyres) dominates the treatment technologies. Energy recovery and refurbishment 
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& reuse (tyres and engine oil) play also a major role. Phasing out of landfilling of old tyres 
occurs in 2012. Also hazardous waste incineration is of very little importance. 
 
 
Figure 16: Material flows due to the EOL of spare parts according to treatment technology 
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5.1.5.4 Life-cycle impacts due to the production of cars and spare parts 
 
The environmental life-cycle impacts due to the production of cars are shown in Table 7 for 
the years 2010, 2020 and 2030. The life-cycle impacts are related to the total material flows 
for the production of cars (Figure 11). However, different trends are seen amongst the 
individual impact categories: compared to 2010, the increases in impacts in the year 2030 
range from 34% (abiotic depletion, global warming, photochemical pollution) to 49% 
(acidification) while material flows increase by 34% (compare also Section 5.1.5.1). This is 
due to the changing car composition over time. 
 
Table 7: Total life-cycle impacts due to car production according to impact categories 
Abiotic depletion Greenhouse gases
Photochemical 
pollution
Acidification 
potential
Eutrophication 
potential Bulk waste
1000 t Sb eq Mt CO2 eq Mt C2H4 eq Mt SO2 eq Mt PO4 eq Mt
2010 8.92 86.36 0.13 1.20 0.10 4.06
2020 11.48 111.15 0.16 1.72 0.13 5.44
2030 11.98 115.86 0.17 1.80 0.14 5.67
Year
 
 
As an example, Figure 17 displays the greenhouse gas emissions disaggregated into the main 
material categories. The respective shares depend on the relative share on the total material 
flow for car production but also on the emission factor for the supply of the respective 
material. Similar to the material flows, the importance of GHG emissions associated with 
steel decreases while high strength steel and aluminium show a relative increase. The shares 
of the other materials remain almost constant. 
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Figure 17: Greenhouse gas emissions due to car production according to material 
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The production of spare parts leads to lower environmental impacts compared to the 
production of new cars (Table 8). Again, the life-cycle impacts are closely related to the total 
material flows for the production (see Figure 18). 
 
 
Table 8: Total life-cycle impacts due to spare parts production according to impact categories 
Abiotic depletion Greenhouse gases
Photochemical 
pollution
Acidification 
potential
Eutrophication 
potential Bulk waste
1000 t Sb eq Mt CO2 eq Mt C2H4 eq Mt SO2 eq Mt PO4 eq Mt
2010 11.96 9.16 0.02 0.46 0.01 1.08
2020 13.95 11.22 0.03 0.64 0.01 1.39
2030 15.46 12.59 0.03 0.76 0.01 1.61
Year
 
 
The impacts according to materials (Figure 18 shows GHG emissions), show similarities with 
respect to the share seen for material flow (Figure 14). For GHG emissions, plastics (26% to 
28%), other materials (26% to 27%), and metals (12% to 13%) dominate the results. 
Refrigerants and PGMs show considerable high shares compared to their low share of mass 
flows which is of course due to their high GHG emission factor for production and supply 
compared to the other materials. 
 
The environmental impacts can also be calculated according to spare parts. The results are 
more in line with the results for the total material flow.  
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Figure 18: Greenhouse gas emissions due to spare parts production according to material 
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5.1.6 Life-cycle impacts 
 
The life-cycle impacts induced by the car fleet up to 2030 are derived from the WTW 
emissions as given in section 5.1.4 and from the impacts from the production of cars and 
spare parts (section 5.1.5.4). The WTW emissions are completed with estimates of the 
impacts in terms of bulk waste and abiotic depletion, using the same coefficients as in 
IMPRO-car. Then, the emissions are converted into mid-point indicators by using the 
corresponding characterization factors. The results are given in table Table 9. 
 
Table 9:  Mid-point indicators for the WTW impacts for the years 2010, 2020 and 2030. 
Abiotic depletion GHG Photochemical pollution acidification eutrophication Bulk waste
1000 t Sb eq Mt CO2 eq Mt C2H4 eq Mt SO2 eq Mt PO4 eq Mt
2010 0.00 1089 3.34 3.90 0.55 0.03
2020 0.00 1238 2.23 3.43 0.37 0.04
2030 0.00 1377 2.03 3.55 0.35 0.04
Year
 
 
These mid-points indicators are summed with those derived for the car production and spare 
parts processes, giving the life-cycle impacts (Table 10). 
 
 
Table 10:  Mid-point indicators for the life-cycle impacts for the years 2010, 2020 and 2030. 
Abiotic depletion GHG Photochemical pollution acidification eutrophication Bulk waste
1000 t Sb eq Mt CO2 eq Mt C2H4 eq Mt SO2 eq Mt PO4 eq Mt
2010 20.88 1185 3.49 5.56 0.66 5.18
2020 25.44 1360 2.42 5.79 0.52 6.86
2030 27.44 1505 2.23 6.10 0.50 7.32
Year
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5.2 Lightweight Case  
 
For the lightweight basecase, ambitious weight reductions assumed to be achievable by 2030 
have been assumed. The reviewed literature suggests that a weight reduction of up to 25-30% 
seems technically achievable in the medium term by means of an intensive use of lightweight 
materials (e.g. aluminium, high-strength, other advanced steels and magnesium) (Table 11). 
 
Table 11:  Overview of weight reduction potentials based on reviewed lightweight studies 
Source Project Lightweight concept Material Weight reduction
(DeCico, 2005)29 ULSAB Material substitution High-strength steels (HSS) ~25% (BIW) 
(Dhinga, 2001)30 NewSteelBody Material substitution HSS, modern steel grades & tailored blanks 25% (BIW) 
(Weiss, 2000)31 Baseline scenario Material substitution & secondary weight savings HSS ~16% (CW) 
(Wallentowitz, 2006)32 – Optimised steel design HSS 25% (BIW) 
(Stodolsky, 1995)33 Aluminium-intensivevehicle (AIV) I 
Limited material 
substitution Aluminium 19% (CW) 
(Stodolsky 1995) AIV II Maximum material substitution Aluminium 31% (CW) 
(Stodolsky 1995) Ford Mercury Sable Material substitution Aluminium 20% (CW) 
(Dhinga 2001), 
(Wallentowitz, 2006) Ford P2000 Material substitution Aluminium 40% (CW) 
(Weiss, 2000) Advanced scenario Material substitution & secondary weight savings Aluminium ~24% (CW) 
(Pehnt, 2001)34 Space frame concept 
Material substitution & 
modified construction 
concept 
Aluminium 30-40% (BIW) 
(Dinga, 2001) Chrysler ESX2 Material substitution Polymer composites ~60% (BIW) 
(Pehnt, 2001) RMI study Material substitution Polymer composites ~65% (BIW) 
(Cheah, 2007)35 Lightweight scenario I Material substitution 
Aluminium, HSS 
& magnesium ~20% (CW) 
(Cheah, 2007) Lightweight scenario II 
Material substitution 
& vehicle redesign 
Aluminium, HSS 
& magnesium ~28% (CW) 
(Cheah, 2007) Lightweight scenario III 
Material substitution, 
vehicle redesign & 
downsizing 
Aluminium, HSS 
& magnesium ~35% (CW) 
 
A broad market penetration of such light cars is not realistic. The maximum scenario variant 
was limited to a 15% reduction by 2030, and assumed to be primarily based on an increased 
use of high-strength steels and aluminium. 
 
In accordance with the literature, the fuel saving potential achievable by vehicle weight 
reduction was assumed to be 0.66% fuel saving for each% weight reduction. The average 
manufacturer costs (3€/kg saved vehicle weight) considered are in line with the costs depicted 
by TNO el al (2006)15 for 9% weight reduction. 
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The required weight reduction is assumed to be mainly achieved by the replacement of 
conventional steel and iron by HSS and the increased use of aluminium. As a consequence of 
the vehicle weight decrease brought about by material substitution, additional secondary 
weight effects that cover one fourth of the targeted weight reduction (3%) are assumed to be 
achievable due to a stronger modification of the structure of the vehicle, a decrease in the 
weight of the chassis and a downsizing of further components. 
 
A more radical scenario (also included in the material database) with higher weight reductions 
(up to 30% by 2030) would depend on the substitution of conventional steel with composite 
materials. However, the use of polymer composites in vehicle construction would entail 
higher additional costs and, its mass production is much more hypothetical. 
 
The assumptions have been translated into TREMOVE through: 
• The vehicle purchase cost of new vehicles in a given (base) year. This parameter is 
updated to include the increased purchase price due to lightweight technology.  
• An adjustment of the fuel consumption in order to include the reduced CO2-emissions 
as a result of lightweight vehicles.  
 
The resulting new baseline can be compared with the original baseline (0% lightweight) with 
respect to stock, demand, emissions. 
 
 
5.2.1 Stock 
 
As cost of vehicle categories change due to increased purchase cost and decreased fuel cost, 
this leads to recalibration of TREMOVE (basecase) vehicle stock. The recalibration causes a 
(small) shift from diesel to petrol when lightweight vehicles are introduced (Table 12). 
 
Table 12:  Share of sales in 2030 per vehicle category for the two basecases (EU27) 
PCDB PCDM PCDS total diesel PCGB PCGM PCGS total gasoline
Central baseline 
scenario 8.5% 31.1% 4.2% 43.8% 5.1% 22.2% 28.7% 56.0%
Lightewight variant 8.5% 30.3% 4.0% 42.8% 5.6% 23.0% 28.6% 57.2%
 
 
 
5.2.2 Demand 
 
Demand (vkm) is influenced by the changed input values are purchase cost and related cost 
components (e.g. insurance cost and tax, repair cost,…). Also fuel cost and tax revenue will 
decrease very substantially due to increased fuel efficiency. A comparison for all relevant 
components is given in Figure 19). 
 
Overall, total cost increases by about 1% in 2030 due to increased purchase cost (and repair 
and insurance cost). Taxes on ownership decrease very little, while insurance tax increases 
slightly. Fuel tax decreases significantly due to increased fuel efficiency. Total taxes decrease 
by about 2.5% in 2030. The increase (or decrease) over years is due to the increasing 
penetration in the market of lightweight vehicles as a consequence of constant fleet renewal. 
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Figure 19:  Difference in cost and tax components in lightweight variant compared to center basecase 
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5.2.3 Well-to wheel emissions 
 
The main effect of the inclusion of lightweight cars concerns CO2 emissions. The other 
pollutants are only affected at WTT level as a result of lower fuel consumption. Exhaust gas 
emissions are unchanged. All new cars starting in 2012 will be reduced in weight, and in 2030 
all cars will emit 10% less CO2 emissions due to this weight reduction. This decrease causes 
average fleet CO2 emissions to decrease over time, as fuel efficient lightweight vehicles will 
continue to replace older non-lightweight vehicles: 
 
Figure 20:  CO2 emissions per car in both basecase variants (central: blue, lightweight: purple) 
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The WTW CO2 emissions in the baseline variant decrease by approximately 10% in 2030 
compared to the central basecase, under the effect of constant fleet renewal with less fuel 
consuming cars. 
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5.2.4 Material flows and associated impacts 
 
The weight reduction results from a change in the material composition of the car, especially 
with regard the contribution of aluminum, HSS, iron and steel. This is visible for both 
production and ELVs (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21:  Difference in material flows between central baseline and lightweight baseline scenario in 
2020 (car production – left – and ELV - right) 
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In car production, there is a major shift from iron and steel towards aluminum and high-
strength steels. The ELVs in 2020 are a mix of lightweight vehicles produced in 2012 or later 
and vehicles with no assumed weight reduction, built prior to 2012. Therefore, the effects are 
less significant for ELV than for new car production. In both scenarios, the total ELV weight 
is lower than new car production weight because the vehicle stock continues to increase over 
the years. 
 
5.2.4.1 Life-cycle impacts due to the production of cars and spare parts 
 
The environmental life-cycle impacts due to the production of cars are shown in Table 16 for 
the years 2010, 2020 and 2030. 
The production of spare parts leads to lower environmental impacts compared to the 
production of new cars (Table 14). 
 
Table 13: Total life-cycle impacts due to car production according to impact categories 
Abiotic 
depletion
Greenhouse 
gases
Photochemical 
pollution
Acidification 
potential
Eutrophication 
potential Bulk waste
1000 t Sb eq Mt CO2 eq Mt C2H4 eq Mt SO2 eq Mt PO4 eq Mt
2010 8.92 86.36 0.13 1.20 0.10 4.06
2020 11.36 107.51 0.16 1.65 0.13 6.85
2030 11.83 111.92 0.16 1.72 0.14 7.14
Year
 
 
Table 14: Total life-cycle impacts due to spare parts production according to impact categories 
Abiotic 
depletion
Greenhouse 
gases
Photochemical 
pollution
Acidification 
potential
Eutrophication 
potential Bulk waste
1000 t Sb eq Mt CO2 eq Mt C2H4 eq Mt SO2 eq Mt PO4 eq Mt
2010 11.96 9.16 0.02 0.56 0.01 1.08
2020 13.95 11.21 0.03 0.73 0.01 1.39
2030 15.46 12.58 0.03 0.85 0.01 1.60
Year
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5.2.5 Life-cycle impacts 
 
The life-cycle impacts induced by the car fleet up to 2030 are derived from the WTW 
emissions as given in section 5.1.4 and from the impacts from the production of cars and 
spare parts (section 5.1.5.4). The WTW emissions are complete with estimates of the impacts 
in terms of bulk waste and abiotic depletion, using the same coefficients as in the IMPRO-car 
study. Then, the emissions are converted into mid-point indicators by using the corresponding 
characterization factors. The results are given in Table 15. 
 
Note should be taken that the estimates are the least reliable for the long term because the 
estimates assume unchanged process technologies. This means that for these periods, the 
impacts are likely to be overestimated. 
 
Table 15: Mid-point indicators for the WTW impacts for the years 2010, 2020 and 2030. 
Abiotic 
depletion GHG
Photochemical 
pollution acidification eutrophication Bulk waste
1000 t Sb eq Mt CO2 eq Mt C2H4 eq Mt SO2 eq Mt PO4 eq Mt
2010 0.00 1089 3.34 3.90 0.55 0.03
2020 0.00 1189 2.19 3.32 0.37 0.03
2030 0.00 1303 1.98 3.39 0.34 0.04
Year
 
 
These mid-points indicators are combined with those derived for the car production and spare 
parts processes, giving the life-cycle impacts (Table 16). 
 
Table 17 shows the effects of the car weight reductions assumed in the scenario by comparing 
the life-cycle impacts with the central basecase. GHG emissions, together with emissions 
contributing to photochemical pollution, acidification and eutrophication are reduced over 
time. Impacts on raw material resources are also slightly reduced. On the contrary, the 
lightweight option results in larger amounts of waste. 
 
Table 16: Mid-point indicators for the life-cycle impacts for the years 2010, 2020 and 2030. 
Abiotic 
depletion GHG
Photochemical 
pollution acidification eutrophication Bulk waste
1000 t Sb eq Mt CO2 eq Mt C2H4 eq Mt SO2 eq Mt PO4 eq Mt
2010 20.88 1185 3.49 5.66 0.66 5.18
2020 25.31 1307 2.38 5.70 0.51 8.27
2030 27.29 1427 2.17 5.96 0.49 8.78
Year
 
 
Table 17: Consequences of the car weight reduction on the life-cycle impacts (% changes compared 
with the central basecase assuming no weight reduction) 
Year Abiotic depletion GHG
Photochemical 
pollution acidification eutrophication Bulk waste
2010 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0%
2020 -0.5% -3.9% -1.6% -1.6% -1.0% 20.5%
2030 -0.5% -5.2% -2.4% -2.4% -1.6% 19.9%  
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6 Feebate 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The feebate approach provides a lot of flexibility due to the different possible settings for the 
tax/subsidy and for the pivot-point. Both can be set constant over the policy period and 
across all car classes. But the pivot-point can also move to lower values over time. This 
would enable an adjustment of the feebate to an increasing penetration of cleaner technologies 
over time, and to the evolving target in terms of CO2 emission from cars. 
 
These parameters will influence the reactions of the consumers which will result in effects on 
vehicle sales, GHG emissions and, also costs for the governments. In theory, since a feebate 
consists of both a tax and a subsidy, the system could be designed in accordance with public 
budget availability. In this respect, the fact that the net costs for the governments will depend 
on revenues from both registration tax fuel taxation should be kept in mind. 
 
As in the case of the labelling of CO2 emissions (see section 2.3), two extreme approaches can 
be considered. In the first approach, the "full absolute approach", the level of tax/subsidy is 
only determined by the CO2 emissions produced by a car. Given the emission pattern of the 
different car classes (see Figure 22), bigger cars will therefore be subject to higher taxes. 
 
Figure 22: Distribution of the different car classes in terms of CO2 emissions (g/km) 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
80 130 180 230 280 330 380
g CO2/km
sh
ar
e 
of
 s
al
es
 Small petrol  Medium petrol  Big petrol
 
 
In the "relative approach", the level of feebate is not only determined by the CO2 emissions, 
but also by an additional parameter which relates to the utility of the car. Such an approach 
would be guided by the higher abatement costs for e.g. big family cars, which inherently 
require a larger engine. On the other hand, a small car which is equipped with an 
“unnecessarily” large engine would be taxed above average. The additional utility-related 
parameter can be the vehicle weight, surface, number of seats, etc. 
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From a modeling perspective, this approach requires more data than required by the absolute 
approach, especially on two aspects: 
• market data for the additional utility parameters considered;  
• cost for CO2 emission reduction, which requires a differentiated abatement cost curve 
with respect to the chosen utility-parameter.  
 
Due to a lack of such data, the report focuses on absolute feebates for which the model was 
developed by using existing data on the abatement costs of the technologies to reduce CO2 
emission from cars and on observed (type-approval) CO2 emission of new cars in the different 
Member States. 
 
 
6.2 Modelling approach 
 
A two-step approach was set up in order to model the effects of this policy instrument at the 
EU27 level with TREMOVE. The method fits with the features of the TREMOVE car sales 
logit which distinguishes between 6 vehicle categories (diesel/petrol and small/medium/large 
engine classes). 
 
In the first step, the expected new preference in terms of fuel efficiency and CO2 emissions is 
calculated within every car category in an ad hoc model developed outside TREMOVE. 
 
In the second step, the new CO2 emission levels per vehicle category have been introduced in 
TREMOVE, together with the corresponding feebate registration tax and vehicle cost changes 
(abatement costs). The effects on demand, vehicle stock and emissions are then calculated 
with TREMOVE. 
 
 
6.2.1 Step 1: reaction within vehicle categories 
 
The full cost of a passenger car in relation to the test cycle CO2 emissions is affected by two 
cost components: 
• The lifetime fuel cost, assuming no changes in fuel price in time, correlates linear with 
CO2 emissions. A low CO2-emitting car is proportionately fuel efficient. 
• The purchase cost of the vehicle increases with the vehicle’s fuel efficiency. TNO et al. 
(2006)15 estimated this correlation for every vehicle category (polynomial function). 
 
CO2 emission reductions entail higher purchase costs as a result of the abatement technology 
while lifetime fuel costs decrease. This means that, at least in theory, an optimal CO2 level 
exists for the consumer. 
 
The latest available CO2 monitoring database (EC, 2007)3 which included the year 2006, 
suggests that this optimal level is not met when consumers buy a new car: Figure 23 displays 
the net additional costs (abatement costs and fuel costs savings) as a function of the CO2 
emission of cars, relative to the value observed in 2006 in the case of big diesel cars. The 
green dot represents the optimal CO2 level (about 167 g/km) with corresponding benefits 
compared to the reference; the red dot represents the observed CO2 emission level in 2006. At 
the left-hand side of the optimal level (green dot), the costs start to increase because the 
increasing fuel costs saving (which is linear with CO2 emissions) does not compensate the 
increasing abatement cost. At the right-hand side from the optimal level, the abatement cost is 
lower than the saved fuel cost. From an economic point of view, it thus makes sense to abate.  
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Figure 23: Relation between CO2 emission level and additional costs compared to reference (year 
2006): Big diesel car (positive value equals a benefit for the car purchaser) 
-4000
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
100 120 140 160 180 200 220
CO2-level (gr/km)
relative cost (€)
 
 
Since the observed CO2 level is higher than the optimal level, it would be logical to abate to 
this point. This observation suggests that there is an additional disutility perceived by the 
consumer for low CO2 emitting cars (e.g. acceleration, size). In the observed CO2 level this 
“economy gap” is approximately 1500€ per vehicle.  
 
Introducing a feebate system adds a third cost component to the cost function (see Figure 24) 
which is the CO2 dependant registration tax. In practice, the feebate system could be 
introduced as discrete categories, relating to the CO2 level. However, for calculation purposes, 
the feebate tax is assumed to be a continuous function. 
 
Due to the introduction of the additional registration tax, the optimal CO2 emission level shifts 
to the left (blue dot). When estimating the reaction of consumers, it is assumed that they will 
not move to the new optimum level, but that they will again internalize the earlier determined 
“economy gap” in the decision, in addition to the additional taxation.  
 
Figure 24: Relation between CO2 emission level and additional costs compared to the reference (year 
2006), including feebate registration tax. Big diesel car (positive value equals a benefit) 
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Therefore, in order to determine the new average CO2 emission level of new cars, with the 
feebate system in place, the new optimal CO2 emission level is first calculated (blue dot). 
Then, the identified “economy gap” is subtracted (yellow dot).  
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Note that this calculation assumes that the identified “economy gap” is the same for all CO2 
emission levels. This assumption has not been proven. Unfortunately, the available data did 
not enable further investigation on that. 
 
 
6.2.2 Step 2: TREMOVE run 
 
The output of the first step holds 3 major parameters: 
• the CO2 emission level under the incentive of the feebate 
• the increase or decrease of the registration tax due to the CO2 differentiated feebate tax 
• the increase of purchase cost. 
 
All three parameter values have been determined for the 6 vehicle categories and imported 
into TREMOVE and then converted to match existing model parameters. The car sales logit 
in the TREMOVE stock module reacts to cost changes of fuel cost, purchase cost and 
registration tax. This consequently affects demand as the generalized price of transport with 
passenger vehicles is altered due to changes in vehicle lifetime cost and purchase behavior. 
Both demand (via changes of total demand and shifts between modes), and stock (via changes 
in average CO2 emission level, fuel consumption and shifts between vehicle categories), 
affect the emission calculation. 
 
 
6.3 Policy cases considered 
 
The French feebate system (see section 3.3) was considered as a first reference to start with. 
The bonus/malus is a discontinuous function of CO2 emissions. However, in order to adjust to 
modeling constraints, a continuous function was built upon this reference as a regression 
function which best fitted the French functiona. The function is shown in green (solid curve) 
in Figure 25 (130_1_1) and is referred to as the "reference policy case". 
 
Several variants were also tested, covering different options with respect to the pivot point 
(120 or 140 g/km), and with respect to the level of the rebate and/or fee part. The removal of 
the rebate part was also included. 
 
The variants are labelled as follows: 
 
"Pivot point (g/km)"_"rebate level relative to central case"_ "fee level relative to central case" 
 
An additional alternative case was also considered, where the shape of the reference policy 
feebate curve was modified. This alternative case is labelled 130_1_1bis (see red curve in the 
figure). 
 
When changing the pivot point, the new function was derived from a vertical shift of the 
initial curve. 
 
In all cases, the feebate system was assumed to be implemented between 2010 and 2015. 
 
 
                                                 
a A first component was derived as the 5 degree polynomial function which best fits the negative part of the French function. 
The second component was derived similarly for the positive part of the French function. 
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Figure 25: Different feebate functions analysed  
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6.4 Reaction of car purchasers to the feebate system 
 
The following presents the results from the first step of the modeling, namely, the response of 
the consumer, including the resulting new CO2 emissions, abatement costs and taxes. As an 
example, Table 18 provides the results for all vehicle categories, for the reference policy case 
(130_1_1). 
 
Table 18: Modelled consumer reaction to the feebate system by vehicle category (130_1_1 case) 
PCDB PCDM PCDS PCGB PCGM PCGS
CO2 emissions level in 2006 (g/km) 211 150 121 249 178 143
theoretical optimal CO2 emissions level (g/km) 167 134 118 162 138 119
"utlity gap" (€) 1509 327 17 3496 976 292
theoretical optimal CO2 emissions level (g/km) 159 124 110 151 124 105
expected CO2 emissions level (g/km) 198 141 113 225 162 121
Current 
situation 
(without 
feebate)
Expectation 
with a 
feebate  
 
The gaps between the theoretical optimal value and the observed value from 2006 sales are 
significant, especially for the larger vehicle categories (87 g CO2/km for PCGB). The "utility 
gap" is also the highest for big vehicle categories, with PCGB again as the extreme case. This 
suggests the importance of other features of vehicles besides just the fuel cost. For smaller 
vehicle categories, the gap is smaller, possibly because small cars owners have more stringent 
budget constraints, therefore making them more sensitive to price. 
 
Also interesting is the fact that the utility gap for diesel cars is narrower than for petrol cars. 
This may be related to the lower abatement costs for petrol cars or higher utility of petrol cars 
versus diesel cars, although diesel technology has improved significantly. There may be other 
unexplained reasons. 
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Given the tax function and the identified “utility gap”, the expected CO2 emission level per 
vehicle category is calculated with the ad hoc model. As expected, the CO2 emission levels 
are modeled to decrease under the influence of the feebate registration tax. This decrease is 
the largest for bigger cars. 
 
Abatement is also greater for petrol cars than for diesel cars because of a higher abatement 
potential. In relative terms, however, the abatement is the same for all size classes; 
approximately 6% for diesel cars. For petrol cars a 10% abatement is expected for big and 
medium cars whereas 15% abatement is expected for small cars. In theory, one would expect 
higher abatement for bigger cars (including in relative terms), because the abatement cost is 
lower compared to smaller cars. However, the higher "economy gap" shown in the calibration 
suggests that bigger car-users are more reluctant to buy more fuel efficient cars. 
 
The importance of taking into account the “utility gap” is clear. The difference between the 
base case and optimum level is greater than the difference between the base case and the 
expected level (for PCGB: a factor 4). This indicates that purchase cost and fuel cost are not 
key parameters in the decision of buying a car (especially for consumers of big cars). Other 
parameters relating to utility appear to be more important. Further research on the importance 
of purchase cost and fuel cost in consumer decision-making would contribute to improving 
the accuracy of the simulations. 
 
The CO2 level is determined by the abatement cost compared to the base case and the feebate 
registration tax level. The difference of the abatement cost and registration tax is presented for 
all vehicle categories in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26: Abatement cost (left) and registration tax (right) as compared to reference per vehicle 
category (negative = a cost for consumer) 
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The figures show that the willingness to pay for more efficient technologies (abatement costs) 
is stronger for smaller cars. However, as the cost per CO2 abated is also higher for smaller 
cars, the actual CO2-emissions abatement will be lower than for big cars. The abatement 
potential is indeed much higher with bigger cars. The abatement cost is higher with petrol cars 
because the CO2 emission levels decrease stronger than with diesel cars. The saved fuel costs 
are more important for petrol than diesel, explaining the stronger abatement level. 
The results for the different policy scenarios are summarized in Table 19 and Table 20. The 
values are averages for the EU-27. 
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Table 19: Expected new CO2 emission levels as a result of the feebate variants (g CO2/km) 
VehType 130_1_1 130_1_1bis 120_1_1 140_1_1 130_1.5_1.5 130_0_1.5 130_0.5_0.5 130_0_0.5 130_0_1
CO2 initial 
level
PCDB 198 200 198 198 192 192 204 204 198 211
PCDM 141 139 141 141 136 141 146 146 143 150
PCDS 113 113 113 113 110 121 117 121 121 121
PCGB 225 233 225 225 215 215 235 235 225 249
PCGM 162 157 162 162 154 158 170 170 163 178
PCGS 121 121 121 121 115 135 129 139 137 143  
 
Table 20: Expected additional purchase tax as a result of the feebate variants (€) 
VehType 130_1_1 130_1_1bis 120_1_1 140_1_1 130_1.5_1.5 130_0_1.5 130_0.5_0.5 130_0_0.5 130_0_1
PCDB 1 293 1 410 1 093 1 483 1 780 1 780 707 707 1 293
PCDM 199 241 -1 390 153 278 142 142 228
PCDS -526 -526 -726 -335 -922 0 -209 0 0
PCGB 1 800 1 524 1 600 1 991 2 452 2 452 992 992 1 800
PCGM 581 712 381 771 646 752 367 367 602
PCGS -287 -287 -487 -96 -690 133 -17 74 111  
 
Despite their identical parameters (PP, fee/rebate levels), the two alternative feebate curves 
(130_1_1 and 130_1_1bis) differ in terms of expected emission reduction for medium and big 
petrol cars. The emissions from medium petrol cars would decline more in the alternative 
case. The opposite would occur for the big petrol cars. Smaller deviations are seen for 
medium and big diesel cars. 
 
These deviations result from the difference in shape of the alternative function: the 
comparative results depend on the respective derivative of the two compared functions, in the 
range in which the emissions of the car is placed. The abatement is the stronger where the 
derivative is higher because the economic gain per CO2 emission reduced is the greatest, thus 
representing a higher incentive to move to smaller emission levels. The effects of the feebate 
will thus potentially depend on the form of the function considered. One can indeed expect 
such effects in real-life (and especially if the function is discontinuous). Predicting the size of 
this effect cannot however, be done with a high degree of accuracy. 
 
The emission reductions do not differ when moving the pivot-point from 120 g/km to 140 
g/km. This is because the way to shift the function (vertically) preserves its initial form. In 
light of the previous paragraph, some deviations may occur in the case of other shift modes. 
 
From a cost perspective, the new taxation level is sensitive to PP: When the PP is lowered 
(raised), the taxation would become higher (lower) for all car types. 
 
The fee and rebate levels have a clear influence on the expected reaction. The effects 
coincide with what is expected: higher fee levels result in higher emission reductions for 
big/medium cars. Higher rebate levels result in higher emission reductions for small cars. The 
cancellation of the rebate part results in almost no emission reduction for small cars. 
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6.5 Effects on transport demand and vehicle purchases  
 
For each policy variant, the parameters derived from previous section have been introduced in 
TREMOVE for the period 2010 to 2015. The following presents the results from the different 
policy simulations in terms of transport demand and new car sales. 
 
In most cases, total costs of car transport are projected to increase due to increased abatement 
costs and registration tax, in spite of the decrease in fuel cost (see section 6.6.1). This induces 
a small decrease in demand (vkm) and in desired stock, thus determining car sales. 
 
Most scenarios indeed result in a small decrease in demand (0.05% to ~0.32% compared to 
total base case new stock) over the period 2010-2015, and even beyond (-0.2% to -0.5% of the 
basecase over the period 2010-2020). This is shown in Figure 27. 
 
The sales decreases are more important in the longer term. This higher increase is explained 
by the increasing generalized passenger car transport costs considered in TREMOVE. These 
costs include the annualized purchase costs of all cars in the fleet (including those from the 
more expensive cars purchased during the 2010-2015 period). 
 
Figure 27: Total decrease in car sales (% of basecase) 
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New diesel car sales are reduced in all cases (because these cars become more expensive than 
gasoline ones (all additional costs being taken into account, including abatement costs) (see 
Figure 28). 
 
The sales of medium cars are decreased, being, in most cases, compensated by additional 
small car sales. The only exception is when the bonus is removed as this cancels the incentive 
to move from medium to small cars. 
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Figure 28: Changes in new car sales by size and fuel (2010-2015 average) – comparison with the 
basecase (positive = increase) 
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6.6 Environmental effects 
 
6.6.1 Well-to-Wheel emissions 
 
Tank-to-Wheel (TTW) emissions are obviously reduced as a result of lower CO2 emissions 
per km driven (see Table 19). The sales-averaged (real-world) CO2 emission reductions of 
new cars are shown in Table 21. 
 
Table 21: Real-world emission factors of new cars 
veh type BC f130 1.0_1.0
f130 
0.5_0.5
f130 
1.5_1.5
f130 
0.0_1.0
f130 
0.0_0.5
f130 
0.0_1.5
f120 
1.0_1.0
f140 
1.0_1.0
f130 
1.0_1.0bis
PCDB 243 227 234 221 227 234 221 227 227 230
PCDM 173 164 169 158 165 169 163 164 164 161
PCDS 137 128 132 124 137 137 137 128 128 128
PCGB 275 249 260 239 249 260 239 249 249 257
PCGM 211 192 201 183 193 201 187 192 192 187
PCGS 177 151 161 144 170 172 168 151 151 151
realworld average 190 172 180 166 179 184 176 172 172 171
type approval 
average 161 146 152 140 152 156 149 146 146 145  
 
The emissions from cars over the period 2010-2015 are reduced by 0.7% to 2.6% w.r.t. the 
basecase. The Well-to-Tank (WTT) CO2 emissions and GHG emissions change in the same 
relative magnitude. Changes are primarily determined by the feebate/rebate level. 
 
The feebate system also induces small benefits in terms of air pollution: 
• SOx emission reduction result from fuel savings. This effect is however negligible at the 
WTW level as TTW SOx emission represent a tiny fraction of WTW emissions. 
• NOx and PM emissions are slightly reduced as a result of fewer diesel cars. 
• CO and VOC emissions are very slightly decreased. 
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The different trends for WTW emissions up to 2020 are shown in Figure 29 in the case of 
GHG emissions and PM emissions. In the first case, the emission reduction w.r.t to the 
basecase increase over the period 2010-2015. Then the gap is kept almost constant over the 
next 5 years because the more efficient cars introduced during the feebate period remain in the 
car fleet. The evolution of PM emissions is explained by both the fuel efficiency improvement 
and by the shift from diesel to petrol cars that are emit fewer particulates. 
 
SOx emissions follow the same pattern as GHG emissions. The other emissions stay almost at 
the same level as the basecase. 
 
Figure 29: Trends in WTW road emissions: GHG emissions and PM emissions 
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6.6.2 Material flows and associated impacts 
 
The following presents the estimated effects of the feebate policy on the different material 
flows and on the environmental impacts resulting from the car production and from the spare 
parts production. To this end, we consider the feebate scenario 130_1_1. Similar results are 
expected for the other scenarios. 
 
Over the period 2010-2015, the total material flow for the production of cars in the feebate 
case is only slightly reduced compared to the base case (Table 22). This overall decrease 
reflects the decreases in sales. A reduction is observed for all single material flows except for 
other plastics and for rhodium. The largest absolute reductions occur for steel, iron, and 
aluminum (44 kt, 39 kt, and 31 kt, respectively). The largest relative reductions are for 
platinum, iron, and aluminum. 
 
The material flows due to the EOL of cars shows a reverse picture. For all materials, the mass 
flow is increased compared to the base case. The largest absolute increases occur for steel, PP, 
and iron (19.8 kt, 4.2 kt, 3.5 kt, respectively). In relative terms, the greatest increases occur 
for high-strength steels, palladium, and refrigerants.  
 
 
 
 
 
FEEBATE 
64 
Table 22: Material flows due to the car and spare part production for the feebate scenario  
(average of 2010 to 2015)  
Material group Material Base case Base case
kt kt [% of BC] kt kt [% of BC]
Metals Aluminium 2 046 2 015 98.5 1 238 1 241 100.3
Copper 216 216 99.9 158 158 100.3
High-strength steel 2 248 2 246 99.9 497 501 100.7
Iron 2 321 2 283 98.3 1 967 1 970 100.2
Lead 164 164 99.9 121 122 100.3
Magnesium 50 50 99.9 30 31 100.3
Steel 9 628 9 584 99.5 8 092 8 112 100.2
Zinc 47 47 99.9 34 34 100.3
Other metals 94 94 99.9 68 68 100.3
Plastics ABS 193 193 99.9 109 109 100.4
PA 95 95 99.9 91 91 100.2
PE 559 559 99.9 347 348 100.3
PET 34 34 99.9 21 22 100.3
PP 2 080 2 078 99.9 1 219 1 223 100.3
PUR 534 534 99.9 370 372 100.3
PVC 7 7 99.9 25 25 100.1
Rubber/Elastomer 494 494 99.9 367 368 100.3
Other plastics 472 491 103.9 461 463 100.4
Fluids Refrigerant 10 10 99.9 4 4 100.5
Oil 141 141 99.9 105 105 100.3
Other fluids 477 476 99.9 345 346 100.3
PGM Palladium 0.035 0.035 100.0 0.015 0.015 100.5
Platinum 0.03 0.029 98.2 0.023 0.023 100.2
Rhodium 0.002 0.002 101.3 0.003 0.003 100.4
Other materials Textile 240 239 99.9 175 175 100.3
Glass 543 542 99.9 395 396 100.3
Other 678 677 99.9 764 766 100.2
Total 23 372 23 269 99.6 17 003 17 048 100.3
Feebate scenario Feebate scenario
Car production End-of-life
 
 
Table 23: Material flows due to production or EOL of spare parts for the feebate scenario  
(average of 2010 to 2015)  
Production EOL 
kt kt kt [% of BC] kt [% of BC]
Lead 338 338 338 99.93 338 99.93
Zinc 19 19 19 99.87 19 99.87
Other metals 284 284 283 99.87 283 99.87
PP 34 34 34 99.93 34 99.93
Rubber/Elastomer 908 908 907 99.87 907 99.87
Other plastics 17 17 17 99.93 17 99.93
Refrigerant 11 11 11 100.01 11 100.01
Oil 491 491 490 99.89 490 99.89
Palladium 0.03 0.03 0.03 100.02 0.025 100.02
Platinum 0.03 0.03 0.03 99.55 0.027 99.55
Rhodium 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.15 0.003 100.15
Textile 95 95 94 99.87 94 99.87
Other 785 785 784 99.89 784 99.89
Total 2 980 2 980 2 976 99.89 2 977 99.89
Other materials
Metals
Plastics
Fluids
PGM
Base case Feebate scenario
Production EOL 
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As regards spare parts, the material flows due to production and EOL are similar (Table 23). 
The mass flow increases only for refrigerants, palladium, and rhodium. 
No significant change in different waste treatment activities are expected (Table 24). 
 
Table 24: EOL treatment of the ELVs and spare parts for the base case and the feebate scenario 
(average from 2010 to 2015)  
kt 
Recycling, 
recovery 
& reuse 
Shredder ARS disposal& landfill 
Hazardous
waste 
incinerator
Export Total 
Base case 8 429 7 494 3 865 5 189 19 983 
Feebate scenario 8 439 7 513 3 879 5 189 20 025 
Difference 0.13% 0.24% 0.35% -0.11% -0.13% 0.21% 
 
The environmental impacts due to the production of cars and of spare parts have been 
calculated according to the LCA methodology presented in Section 4.4. Environmental 
impacts are reduced for all impact categories compared to the base case (Table 25). The 
reduction of the impacts is more pronounced for the production of new cars compared to the 
production of spare parts. Overall environmental impacts are reduced by 0.09% to 0.52%. 
 
Table 25: Environmental impacts from the production of cars and spare parts for the feebate 
scenario (average from 2010 to 2015)  
Base case Base case Base case
[% of BC] [% of BC] [% of BC]
AD kt Sb eq 9.47 9.46 99.9% 12.45 12.44 99.9% 21.92 21.90 99.9%
GHG Mt CO2 eq 91.68 91.35 99.6% 9.69 9.68 99.9% 101.37 101.03 99.7%
POCP kt C2H4 eq 134.5 134.1 99.6% 24.7 24.6 99.9% 159.2 158.7 99.7%
AP kt SO2 eq 1327.3 1323.1 99.7% 495.9 495.3 99.9% 1823.2 1818.4 99.7%
EP kt PO4 eq 109.7 109.5 99.8% 9.9 9.8 99.9% 119.6 119.4 99.8%
BW Mt  4.37 4.35 99.4% 1.15 1.14 99.9% 5.52 5.49 99.5%
total
Feebate scenario Feebate scenarioFeebate scenario
Production of cars Production of spare parts
 
 
 
6.6.3 Life-cycle impacts 
 
The life-cycle impacts from the car fleet in the base case and in the policy scenario are 
calculated by combining the results derived in sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.2. The results are shown 
in Table 26 in the case of the feebate 130_1_1 for the period 2010-2015. 
 
Table 26: Effects of the feebate instrument on the life-cycle impacts from the car fleet 
basecase f130_1_1
% change 
w.r.t 
basecase
basecase f130_1_1
% change 
w.r.t 
basecase
basecase f130_1_1
% change 
w.r.t 
basecase
abiotic depletion (kt Sb eq) 0.00 0.00 -1.8% 21.92 21.90 -0.1% 21.93 21.91 -0.1%
GHG emissions (Mt CO2-eq) 1 122 1 101 -1.8% 101 101 -0.3% 1 223 1 202 -1.7%
acidification (kt SO2 eq) 7 421 7 331 -1.2% 1 823 1 818 -0.3% 9 244 9 150 -1.0%
eutrophication (kt PO4 eq) 980 975 -0.5% 120 119 -0.2% 1 099 1 095 -0.4%
Photochemical 
Pollultion (kt C2H4 eq) 5 920 5 893 -0.5% 159 159 -0.3% 6 079 6 052 -0.5%
Bulk waste (Mt) 0.03 0.03 -1.8% 5.52 5.49 -0.5% 5.55 5.52 -0.5%
WTW Production of cars and spare parts Total
 
 
The table shows that the feebate instrument would result in reductions in GHG emissions, 
acidification, eutrophication and photochemical pollution of the same magnitude as what is 
expected for the WTW part.  
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6.7 Economic impacts 
 
6.7.1 Effects on household expenditures and taxation 
 
The primary consequences of the feebate system concern the following costs (Figure 30): 
• Purchase costs (retailer price): the incentive to the purchase of more efficient cars 
indirectly results in more expensive cars due to of costs from abatement technologies. 
The total purchase costs at EU27 level are determined by the new car sales patterns. 
• Registration tax: the main effect depends on the feebate system. 
• Fuel costs: the penetration of more efficient cars reduces the fuel consumption and thus 
the fuel costs (including taxes). 
 
Other costs (e.g. repairing, insurance) are indirectly affected in the same direction as purchase 
costs because they are assumed to be proportional to the purchase costs. 
 
The average costs incurred in the different scenarios over the period 2010-2015 are 
summarised in Figure 30 and in Table 27 (costs differences between the simulations and the 
basecase). Over all scenarios considered, consumer expenditures for cars would increase by 
0.6% to 1.2% compared to the basecase. Regarding tax, the purchase tax (and VAT) revenue 
is expected to increase in all cases whereas the fuel tax revenue would decrease as a result of 
improved fuel economy. In most cases, the total tax revenue is expected to increase.  
 
Figure 30: Differences in costs between simulations and basecase scenario – average over the period 
2010-2015 
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When considering these costs over the longer period 2010-2020 (Table 28), the absolute and 
relative importance of fuel costs changes is higher and the average net costs for the consumers 
are lower (~2% BC) whereas the expected average tax revenue is lower and even becoming 
negative in several cases. Considering such a longer term perspective is relevant when 
assessing ex ante the implications for public budgets. Indeed, when only looking at 
registration tax, the feebate system appears to generate revenue for the government. However, 
if loss of fuel tax is taken into account, this revenue is completely balanced out. 
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Table 27: Cost differences between simulations and basecase scenario – average over the period 
2010-2015 (106€) 
f130 
1.0_1.0
f130 
1.0_1.0bis
f130 
0.5_0.5
f130 
1.5_1.5
f130 
0.0_1.0
f130 
0.0_0.5
f130 
0.0_1.5
f120 
1.0_1.0
f140 
1.0_1.0
purchase cost & 
others 13 212 14 473 7 980 16 920 11 837 6 782 15 798 10 029 16 042
fuel cost -2 315 -2 501 -1 280 -3 269 -1 547 -882 -2 068 -2 268 -2 339
total cost 10 897 11 972 6 700 13 651 10 289 5 900 13 730 7 761 13 703
(%BC) (0.9%) (1.0%) (0.6%) (1.2%) (0.9%) (0.5%) (1.2%) (0.7%) (1.2%)
registration tax 4 600 5 302 3 790 3 082 7 725 4 549 10 008 811 8 198
fuel tax -2 620 -2 802 -1 472 -3 644 -1 706 -982 -2 272 -2 566 -2 642
other tax 1 060 1 120 503 1 748 441 238 630 1 165 935
total tax 3 039 3 620 2 822 1 187 6 459 3 805 8 365 -590 6 491
(%BC) (0.9%) (1.1%) (0.9%) (0.4%) (2.0%) (1.2%) (2.6%) -(0.2%) (2.0%)  
 
Table 28: Cost differences between simulations and basecase scenario – average over the period 
2010-2020 (106€) 
f130 
1.0_1.0
f130 
1.0_1.0bis
f130 
0.5_0.5
f130 
1.5_1.5
f130 
0.0_1.0
f130 
0.0_0.5
f130 
0.0_1.5
f120 
1.0_1.0
f140 
1.0_1.0
purchase cost & 
others 5 815 5 664 3 107 6 721 4 872 2 769 6 546 3 746 6 466
fuel cost -3 435 -3 705 -1 897 -4 831 -2 277 -1 299 -3 039 -3 353 -3 464
total cost 2 381 1 958 1 210 1 890 2 595 1 470 3 506 392 3 003
(%BC) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.3%) (0.0%) (0.2%)
registration tax 2 483 2 854 2 048 1 633 4 191 2 468 5 428 412 4 436
fuel tax -3 785 -4 032 -2 114 -5 237 -2 439 -1 404 -3 245 -3 685 -3 799
other tax 52 -71 -84 122 -207 -127 -251 70 -155
total tax -1 250 -1 249 -150 -3 482 1 544 937 1 931 -3 203 482
(%BC) -(0.4%) -(0.4%) (0.0%) -(1.0%) (0.5%) (0.3%) (0.6%) -(0.9%) (0.1%)  
 
 
6.7.2 Indirect economic impacts 
 
The indirect economic impacts of the feebate scenarios have been calculated according the 
methodology described in Section 4.5. 
 
The total household expenditure according to industry sectors is summarized in Table 29. 
Compared to the base case, household expenditure is increased for passenger cars, trade 
services, and (for most scenarios) other motor vehicles and market services. This is due to the 
effect of the policy which increases the demand for passenger cars. 
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Table 29: Base case expenditures by households (M€) and relative change in the feebate scenarios – 
average of the period 2010-2015 
Sector BC
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Agriculture 132695 -0.12% -0.12% -0.04% -0.24% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% -0.17% -0.06%
Construction 1113110 -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 
Market services 3341999 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.02% 0.08% 0.05% 0.10% 0.00% 0.08% 
Non-market services 3180579 -0.03% -0.03% -0.01% -0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.04% -0.01%
Trade services 1656805 0.06% 0.07% 0.05% 0.06% 0.09% 0.05% 0.12% 0.02% 0.10% 
Metals 149605 -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% -0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.03% -0.01%
Chemicals 286680 -0.06% -0.06% -0.02% -0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.08% -0.03%
Non-metallic minerals 39994 -0.07% -0.07% -0.02% -0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.10% -0.04%
Pulp, paper & printing 144014 -0.11% -0.11% -0.04% -0.21% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% -0.16% -0.05%
Food, beverages & tobacco 635418 -0.13% -0.13% -0.05% -0.26% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% -0.19% -0.07%
Textiles 198496 -0.11% -0.12% -0.04% -0.23% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% -0.17% -0.06%
Machinery & equipment 984844 -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% -0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.03% -0.01%
Other industries 309777 -0.08% -0.08% -0.03% -0.16% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.12% -0.04%
Passenger cars 225624 2.29% 2.42% 1.17% 3.46% 1.29% 0.72% 1.78% 2.31% 2.19% 
Other motor vehicles 251280 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 
Automotive fuels 99928 -1.33% -1.43% -0.72% -1.93% -0.82% -0.47% -1.11% -1.36% -1.31%
Other energy 169672 -0.12% -0.12% -0.04% -0.23% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% -0.17% -0.06%
Total 12920518 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.05% 0.03% 0.06% 0.00% 0.05%
 
Total employment increases for all feebate scenarios. The only exception is the scenario 
120_1_1 which shows a very slight employment decrease (Figure 31). Total employment 
effects range from -26 000 to 187 000 employees, corresponding to a change of -0.01% to 
0.08% compared to the base case. 
 
Sectoral results show positive employment effects in the sectors passenger cars, other motor 
vehicles, market services, trade services, and metals for all scenarios. Impacts in other sectors 
are either neutral or negative. 
 
Total value added shows an increase for all scenarios except for the scenario 120_1_1 and 
follows closely the pattern of sectoral employment (Figure 32). Impacts on value added are – 
in general – less pronounced than for employment. Total value added impacts range from -
0.002% to +0.067% which corresponds to about -270 to 7 780 M€). 
 
The impacts on value added for individual industry sectors follow the same pattern than for 
employment. All scenarios result in positive value added effects in the sectors passenger cars, 
other motor vehicles, market services, metals and trade services. Small negative impacts occur 
in the automotive fuel sector for all scenarios. For the other sectors, positive effects are 
expected in the majority of scenarios. The value added impacts of the individual sectors range 
from range from -0.9% to +3.5%.  
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Figure 31: Employment effects of the feebate scenarios (1 000 employees) for the period 2010-2015.  
A: Total employment effects; B: Sectoral employment effects 
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Figure 32: Value added effects of the feebate scenarios (M€) for the period 2010-2015.  
A: Total value added effects; B: Sectoral value added effects 
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6.8 Concluding remarks 
 
The above analysis and results provide an overview of the environmental and economic 
impacts of a feebate instrument if applied at EU27 level. According to the TREMOVE 
scenarios, slight vehicle sales decreases are expected. Small car sales could significantly 
increase, mostly on the expense of medium cars. A shift is also expected from diesel to petrol 
cars. 
 
The instrument would result in reductions of the WTW GHG emissions from the EU27 car 
fleet, because consumers would be encouraged to choose more efficient cars when purchasing 
a new vehicle. This holds true both in the short term (0.7% to 2.6% reductions of over the 
period 2010-2015, compared to basecase) and for the longer term. Positive effects on air 
pollution are less significant. 
 
The conclusion is also valid when the life-cycle impacts indirectly caused by the car and spare 
parts production are included. 
 
The analysis also illustrates some of the various possibilities regarding the feebate scheme 
(PP, respective levels of fee and rebate and form of the feebate curve), showing how the 
environmental effects and costs would vary.  
 
In general the effects are the most sensitive to the fee and to rebate levels. Some of the 
specific schemes can be discriminated with a certain level of confidence: the higher the fee 
level is, the higher the tax revenue and emission reductions will be. Higher bonus levels result 
in higher CO2 emission reductions from small cars. On the other hand, the bonus removal 
guarantees higher tax revenues for the governments. 
 
The exact effects have however to be envisaged with cautious: The modeling approach would 
gain in robustness with better data to better capture the influence of the different parameters. 
Also, some aspects of the feebate (the form of the function) are likely to have effects in real-
life that can not be fully assessed ex ante. Finally, the outcome may vary substantially 
depending on the initial purchasing patterns and initial taxation regime which both depend on 
the situation of each country. 
 
The scenarios made with TREMOVE have been performed against a baseline where CO2 
emissions have been kept at a level which does nott reflect the recently adopted regulation on 
CO2 emissions from cars (see section 2.2) which sets a target for 2015 (130 g/km) and a long 
term target for 2020 (95 g/km). In this new regulatory context, achieving emission reductions 
with the feebate instrument would imply adjusting the parameters accordingly. 
 
Overall, slight increases in household expenditures are estimated and the tax revenue would 
also increase, at least in the short term. 
 
The estimation of the macroeconomic impacts made with the Input-Ouput tables, shows that 
the sectors directly concerned (the automotive sector and supply sectors, including metal 
industry) would gain both in terms of value added and employment. Depending on the feebate 
scheme, the effects on the other sectors would be either neutral or negative. 
 
Overall, the feebate instrument offers benefits both to the environment and to the economy. 
From an environmental standpoint, it can contribute to the EU strategy to reduce CO2 
emissions from cars. From an economic point of view, the instrument may be adjusted in 
accordance with public budget constraints and employment goals. 
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7 Cash for replacement policy 
 
7.1 Modeling approach 
 
The modeling of the cash for replacement policy requires modeling the expected response of 
the owner of an old car to the proposed subsidy for car scrappage. 
 
This entailed further developments in the available TREMOVE version (3.1). In this model 
version, the car renewal is based on exogenously estimated probability (an exogenous 
scrappage function) that a vehicle in year t will survive in the subsequent year vehicle stock 
(year t+1). The probability is a function of the age of the vehicle and differs for all countries. 
To enable a simulation of scrappage policy with TREMOVE, the exogenous scrappage 
functions had to be converted into an endogenous function. 
 
Two main driving forces for scrappage were taken into account: 
• circumstances the owner cannot control (accident)  
• economic considerations influencing the decision of the owner.  
 
The first is captured through the differentiated probability of accident per age and vehicle 
category which was estimated by using European statistics from ERSO36 and CARE37 on 
accidents and the average yearly mileage already in the TREMOVE input database. 
 
The latter was estimated with a discrete choice modela representing the economic decision of 
a car owner to remove his/her car by either scrapping it or selling it. This decision was 
assumed to be dependent on the following variables: 
• repair & maintenance costs 
• cost of a new car 
• residual value (i.e. the second hand market price) 
• scrap subsidy (an exogenous policy parameter) 
 
In the following section we first discuss the data availability and then the modeling approach 
implemented. 
 
 
7.1.1 Data availability 
 
The repair and maintenance costs are a function of the age of the vehicle. The younger the 
vehicle, the lower the total repair and maintenance costs will be. In the TREMOVE 2.7 
version, the maintenance costs are conceived of a percentage of the purchase cost and increase 
linearly up to an age of 6 years. After 6 years, cost is assumed constant. Data collected from 
the German ADAC databaseb were used to check and, where relevant, refine TREMOVE 
assumptions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
a Background on discrete choice models: “Discrete choice methods with simulation”, Kenneth E. Train, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. Available online at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/books/choice2.html. 
b The ADAC database holds cost data including repair cost for all existing passenger vehicles (by brand, type, subtype). 
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When building the exogenous function, it was uncertain which new vehicle type would be 
assumed to be subsequently purchased (this is determined by the car sales logit), It was 
assumed that the new purchased vehicle is of the same type (size, fuel) as the one that will be 
removed from the stock. The purchase cost (and registration tax) assumed in the new 
scrappage function were set accordingly using the costs already embedded in the TREMOVE 
database. Note that TREMOVE assumes a constant increase in purchase cost of passenger 
vehicles over time. This increase reflects the increased cost of new features (e.g. air-
conditioning). 
 
The residual value for a vehicle is, in fact, the price of the car on the second hand market. 
The second hand market value is a function of the age of the vehicle. Clearly, younger 
vehicles are more valuable than older ones. The estimation of the residual value is based on 
the Schwacke database38 which holds estimations of second hand value of all passenger 
vehicles (brand, type, subtype) per manufacturing year for Germany. This dataset is the most 
extensive and consistent with respect to second hand market prices. To make the estimation 
applicable for other countries as well, the value estimation was set up as a second hand value 
compared to the new vehicle price. The database is too large to cover all vehicles; therefore 3 
representative samples were taken to reflect small, medium and big cars: 
• Small: Ford Fiesta 1.3 G-Kat 
• Medium: Audi A4 1.6 
• Big: BMW 5er - 520i 
 
The analysis showed that, with an offset of about 35% after the first year, the value 
deprivation is similar for all vehicles types, in relative terms. A regression (exponential) 
function is fitted and applied in the scrappage model. 
 
Figure 33: Second hand market value (% of new vehicle price), for small (blue), medium (green) and 
big cars (red) 
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7.1.2 Model for scrappage decision 
 
The decision for scrapping the vehicle can be modeled as a discrete choice, considering the 
following two possible choices and the associated utilities for the consumer: 
• Keeping the vehicle: utility U1. 
• Removing the vehicle: utility U2. 
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The choice between the two alternatives only depends on the difference ΔU = U2-U1. Based 
on the information gained as to the choice process, the following variables are expected to be 
relevant (the removal of the vehicle being the ‘positive’ outcome): 
• Repair and maintenance costs: keeping a vehicle in operation for another year will come 
at a given cost. As mentioned earlier, this is dependant on the age of the vehicle. A 
positive sign for the coefficient is expected. 
• Cost of a new vehicle: A negative sign for the coefficient is expected. 
• Residual value: the vehicle currently owned still has a value to the car owner. This value 
is equated to the price the owner could get for his car if he were to sell it on the second 
hand market. Whether the car owner decides to scrap or sell his car, he still loses this 
value. As the residual value decreases with increasing age, a negative sign for the 
coefficient is expected. 
 
We can determine the shares of scrapping or keeping the vehicle with the exogenous survival 
functions and the given scrappage subsidy (in the reference case: 0€). On the one hand, we 
can determine the utilities for both options, derived from repair & maintenance costs, new car 
prices, scrap subsidies and residual values. On the other hand, we know how many vehicles 
are scrapped or sold on the second hand market and how many are kept (from the exogenous 
scrappage functions). With these known figures, we can estimate and calibrate the discrete 
choice model for keeping or removing a car from circulation. Calibration of the model was 
made for the existing scrappage curves for the year 2005. 
 
When modeling the scrappage scheme, one has to bear in mind that some car owners who 
would scrap their vehicle anyway will benefit from the subsidy together with consumers who 
will shift from selling their cars on the second hand market to scrapping, given that the 
subsidy is high enough. 
 
 
7.1.3 Results of the scrappage model 
 
Simulations of the survival probability under possible scrappage policies are presented in 
Figure 34, Figure 35 and Figure 34. Psur0 is the baseline probability without a subsidy, 
Psur2000 is the case with a subsidy of 2000€ for cars older than 10 years, Psur2000_8 is the 
case of a subsidy of 2000€ older than 8 years old, Psur3000 is for the case of a subsidy of 
3000€ for cars older than 10 years, Psur500 is for the case of a subsidy of 500€ for cars older 
than 10 years old, Psur1500 is for the case of a subsidy of 1500€ for cars more than 10 years 
old. 
 
They all look very similar. Because smaller cars are cheaper and have a lower residual value, 
the scrappage policy takes effect much sooner. Allowing the polices to start two years earlier 
has no impact because even for small cars the residual value has not dropped enough by then 
to make the policy effective. 
 
All of the graphs suggest that the policies have a very strong effect on the scrappage once they 
become operational. The main difference between the policies is the amount of the scrap 
subsidy. The higher the subsidy amount is, the earlier the scrappage starts. The reaction may 
be overestimated compared to what would be expected in reality, although there is no data to 
compare with. These graphs also suggest that scrappage policies would primarily remove 
small and medium old cars. 
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Figure 34: Simulated probabilities that a car will reach a given age (big gasoline cars, Germany). 
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Figure 35: Simulated probabilities that a car will reach a given age (medium gasoline cars, 
Germany). 
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Figure 36: Simulated probabilities that a car will reach a given age (small gasoline cars, Germany). 
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7.2 Policy cases considered 
 
A cash-for-replacement policy can be based on parameters such as the old car age threshold, 
the subsidy level, the environmental performance of the old car (as compared to the new one), 
car mileage. However, this last parameter is more difficult to monitor. The environmental 
performance, especially regarding air pollution, is rather closely linked to the car age. 
 
An optimal set of parameters cannot be preselected. However some first insight can be gained 
as to the effects of choosing a certain age threshold in terms of environmental efficiency 
improvement. One can indeed associate the car age with its environmental performance 
through the Euro standard it complies with. 
 
Figure 37 displays some relevant information about petrol and diesel cars that will be part of 
the 2010/2015 car fleet. It first (three first bars) shows the maximum air pollutant emission 
levels prescribed by the different Euro standards relative to the Euro5 standard which will be 
obligatory as of 2009. Next come the maximum age and share in car fleet in 2010 and 2015. 
 
The literature suggests that the most realistic age threshold is in a range of 8 to 12 years. 
When comparing 8 and 10 year thresholds, the eligibility to the system would not differ in 
terms of Euro standard coverage. In 2010, both cases would potentially cover cars up to Euro3 
and, at the end of the period, Euro4 cars would be concerned as well. There would be 
differences in the intermediate period. With a 12 year threshold, the system would potentially 
tackle cars up to Euro2 (Euro3) in 2010 (2015). 
 
Consequently, the decision was made to concentrate on 8 and 10 year constant thresholds.  
Regarding the subsidy, section 7.1 suggests that the subsidy would not only make a real 
difference if it is greater than 1000€. 
 
 
Figure 37: Key factors in determining the age threshold for the scrappage policy: in both diagrams 
The three first bars represent the performance of air standard in terms of air pollutant emission levels, relative to the Euro5 
standard. Next come the maximum age (years) and share in car fleet (%) in 2010 and in 2015  
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Three subsidy amounts are then considered: 1000€, 2000€, 2500€ constant cases. Regarding 
the last case, one can expect that the modelling will lead to less reliable results because the 
magnitude of change introduced would lay beyond the scope of consistency expected with 
TREMOVE. This has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. As will be seen later, 
(section 7.3), the last case may lead to an extreme outcome in terms of car purchases. 
 
Also interesting is to consider subsidies that evolve over the policy period. Two options have 
been selected, with a subsidy steadily increasing and decreasing respectively. The first option 
would, in principle, reduce the public budget burden in the short term. The second option 
would, on the contrary increase the effects in the short time. 
 
Table 30 provides the list of cash-for –replacement scenarios considered for the modelling. 
The last column provides the average level of the subsidy over the period considered, which is 
relevant when comparing scenarios such as s10_2000_2000 and s10_1000_3000. 
 
Table 30: List of cash-for-replacement policy scenarios  
2010 2015 average over the period 2010-2015
s8  1000_1000 8 1 000 1 000 1 000
s8  2000_2000 8 2 000 2 000 2 000
s8  2500_2500 8 2 500 2 500 2 500
s10 1000_1000 10 1 000 1 000 1 000
s10 2000_2000 10 2 000 2 000 2 000
s10 2500_2500 10 2 500 2 500 2 500
s10  500_1500 10 500 1 500 1 000
s10  1000_3000 10 1 000 3 000 2 000
s10  1500_ 500 10 1 500 500 1 000
s10  3000_1000 10 3 000 1 000 2 000
scenario name old car age threshold
subsidy (euros)
 
 
 
7.3 Effects on transport demand and vehicle stock 
 
The transport demand in the policy scenario is projected to decrease over the period 2010-
2015 (by up to 2.7% in the case of the most extreme scenario - s10_2500_2500). 
 
This somewhat contradicts the intuition that the subsidy - making passenger cars cheaper - 
would result in a transport demand increase. 
 
However, this driver is counterbalanced by other cost components: In TREMOVE (see Table 
31), new cars purchase costs are assumed to increase over time (due to new luxury features, 
safety features, emission standards and increased fuel efficiency). This shifts running costs 
(fuel cost) to purchase costs. Therefore, in any given year, new vehicles are more expensive in 
purchase cost than the scrapped vehicles. Consequently, the higher renewal rate of vehicles 
stimulated by the subsidy results in higher annualized purchase costs of the car fleet. Overall, 
the higher purchase cost is not compensated by the lump sum of subsidy - which is allocated 
to the registration tax -, saved fuel cost and repair cost. On the contrary, the generalized price 
for passenger car transport is increased. 
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Also, after the scrappage scheme, the decrease gradually fades out, as explained by the quick 
renewal rate already achieved during the scrappage scheme period, resulting in a stock which 
is older compared to the basecase. Older also means cheaper, thus resulting in a lower cost for 
passenger vehicle transport in the simulation. 
 
Table 31: Purchase cost of cars assumed in TREMOVE 
€ % 2000 price €
% 1995 
price €
% 1995 
price €
% 1995 
price €
% 1995 
price €
% 1995 
price
1995 - - 14 286 100% 26 035 100% 8 777 100% 16 392 100% 33 637 100%
2000 11 073 100% 15 855 111% 28 181 108% 8 970 102% 16 472 100% 33 722 100%
2005 11 507 104% 16 626 116% 29 400 113% 9 031 103% 16 154 99% 33 869 101%
2010 11 353 103% 16 469 115% 29 303 113% 9 454 108% 16 696 102% 34 678 103%
2015 11 671 105% 16 766 117% 29 987 115% 9 587 109% 16 958 103% 35 058 104%
2020 11 980 108% 17 169 120% 30 743 118% 9 496 108% 17 026 104% 35 501 106%
PCGM PCGBPCDS PCDM PCDB PCGS
 
 
This has to be kept in mind when interpreting other results (see emissions in section 7.4.1). 
Regarding the effects on the car fleet, compared to the basecase scenario, more old cars will 
be disposed of and subsequently will be replaced by new cars. Table 32 presents the car fleet 
composition in 2015 by different age classes, showing the accelerated renewal of the car fleet. 
The share of cars older than 10 years is reduced in all scenarios in comparison to the basecase. 
The biggest changes are seen when the average subsidy level during the policy period is as 
high as 2000€. 
 
 
Table 32: Composition of the car fleet by of car age classes (year 2015) 
1-10 years >10 years
Basecase 62.9% 37.1%
s8  1000_1000 65.0% 35.0%
s8  2000_2000 72.3% 27.7%
s8  2500_2500 71.4% 28.6%
s10 1000_1000 65.0% 35.0%
s10 2000_2000 72.3% 27.7%
s10 2500_2500 71.1% 28.9%
s10  500_1500 65.7% 34.3%
s10  1000_3000 74.0% 26.0%
s10  1500_ 500 65.7% 34.3%
s10  3000_1000 72.9% 27.1%  
 
 
The dynamic of the car fleet renewal for the different scenarios (Figure 38) is shown to be 
highly influenced by both the size of the subsidy and its evolution. In all cases where the 
subsidy is either kept constant over time or set to gradually decline, the effects (car sales 
increases) are the greatest at the beginning of the period. This is because very old vehicles, 
with low residual value are scrapped in large amounts already in the first year. After this first 
year, the average age of the stock is considerably lower, thus reducing the effect of the 
scrappage scheme. 
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The size of the initial subsidy determines the level of car sales increases. This is especially 
true when the subsidy is beyond 2000€. When the subsidy is kept lower or equal to 1000€, the 
effects are not as strong. 
 
A general key insight for these policy cases is the fact that the system will induce its main 
effects – including on the manufacturing sector - after a couple of years and that it does not 
need to be maintained for a long period of time.  
On the contrary, when the subsidy is gradually increased, the effects increase over time (see 
for instance 10_2000_2000 and s10_1000_3000). 
 
Over time, sales actually experience a wave effect: In all cases, the sales increases induced by 
the scrappage policy are later reduced as compared to the basecase, when the bulk of the cars 
sold at the beginning of the scheme are replaced. 
 
The age threshold is shown to be of less importance than the subsidy level and its evolution 
(at least when considering 8 or 10 years). This is especially true when the subsidy is kept low. 
This is because the residual value of 8 year cars is higher than for older cars and the subsidy is 
not attractive enough to encourage car scrappage. 
 
Figure 38: New car sales over time for the different policy scrappage schemes 
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As shown in Figure 39, over the scheme period (2010-2015), the total new car sales are 
substantially increased over the period (5% to 42% w.r.t basecase). The magnitude of the 
effect is obviously linked to the size of the subsidy. 
 
The dynamic of the scrappage instrument is also an influencing factor. For one given average 
subsidy over 2010-2015 (for instance s10_2000_2000 and s_10_1000_3000), the case where 
the subsidy is gradually increased results in the larger average sales increase. 
 
The effect of the scrappage policy on car sales might be amplified by the modeling approach 
where the scrappage decision logit strongly reacts for very old vehicles (see section 7.1.3). 
Also, the reliability of these high figures has also to be assessed in the light of the ability of 
the automotive industry to react accordingly. 
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When considering the long-term perspective, the average car sales increases are lower (1.1% 
to 12.8% w.r.t basecase). 
 
No particular trend is seen in either fuel share or size class shares. 
 
Figure 39: Total change in car sales (% w.r.t basecase) 
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7.4 Environmental effects: 
 
7.4.1 Well-to-Wheel emissions 
 
The environmental effects of the scrappage policy concern both GHG emissions and air 
pollutant emissions. These effects over the period 2010-2020 are displayed in Figure 40. 
In all cases, the scrappage policy is expected to entail emission reductions as compared to the 
basecase, especially during the policy scheme. The size and dynamic of effects depend on the 
nature of emissions and different drivers: 
• The influence of fuel efficiency versus end-of-pipe technologies: GHG emissions and 
SOx emissions are primarily dependent upon the first factor, whereas the air pollutants 
are more dependent upon the abatement technology.  
• The gain in efficiency when shifting from an old to a new car is also a key factor. The 
gain is the lowest for GHG and SOx emissions and the highest for VOC and CO 
emissions. 
 
The effects on CO2 emissions differ from those expected for air pollutant emissions. 
 
The improvements expected for air pollutants are unambiguous and significant. However, it 
has to be noted that these emissions are expected to decline in the basecase anyway thanks to 
the phase in of Euro5 (2009) and Euro6 (2014). One can thus consider that a scrappage policy 
would have had more effects if implemented some years ago. 
 
The modeling suggests smaller and more temporary improvements regarding CO2 emissions; 
the effects disappear once the system is phased out. 
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The robustness of these emission reductions is also lower: the projected emission reduction is 
indeed almost entirely driven by the unexpected transport demand decrease (see section 7.3). 
 
Figure 40: Effects of scrappage policy cases on WTW emissions 
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The fact that the policy scenario assumes baseline emissions that are more pessimistic than 
the emission pathway aimed at with the new CO2 & car regulation (emissions decline to 130 
g/km by 2015) should be also remembered. This means that, during the period when the 
subsidy is in place, emissions should start to decrease. However, because the effects of the 
policy instrument are the stronger during the 2 first years (unless the subsidy is initially set 
low and then increases over time), the emissions might still be close to the current level (160 
g/km). The emission reductions would thus only be slightly higher than what is modeled. 
 
A higher energy efficiency leap from the old scrapped car to the new one would actually be 
needed to observe significant gains which should be the case later as a result of the regulation 
on CO2 emissions from cars. Stronger positive effects would indeed happen with a subsidy 
put in place later when the emissions from new cars are closer to the 2015 target, and, even 
more when they approach the 2020 target (95 g/km). 
 
In addition, given the fact that a scrappage policy instrument would, in the short term, pull up 
sales of slightly more efficient cars, the car fleet renewal would later be reduced, when car 
emissions are substantially declining. Therefore, the scrappage policy could potentially reduce 
the effects of the 2020 policy target on CO2 emissions. 
 
From an environmental point of view, the scrappage policy would thus come late with regard 
to air pollution, and, too early with regard to GHG emissions. 
 
 
7.4.2 Material flows and associated impacts 
 
The material flows (and associated environmental impacts) due to car and spare parts 
production and to the ELVs and spare parts have been estimated. The following shows the 
results for one selected scrappage scenario (s10_1000_1000) as an example of these effects. 
 
In this case, the total material flows due to the production of cars over the period 2010-2015 
are shown to increase by about 5% compared to the base case (Table 33). This increase is in 
line with the expected sales increases as stimulated by the scrappage policy (Figure 38). This 
increase also holds true for the individual material flows. The greatest increases in absolute 
terms occur for steel, iron, and HSS (0.50 Mt, 0.12 Mt, and 0.12 Mt, respectively). Relative 
increases do not differ so much between the individual material flows. 
 
The material flows due to the ELVs react similarly to the material flows for car production. 
For almost all materials, the mass flow is higher in the scrappage scenario compared to the 
base case. Steel, PP, aluminum, and iron show the greatest increases (0.11 Mt, 0.03 Mt, 0.02 
Mt, and 0.02 Mt, respectively). Again, the relative changes are similar across the individual 
materials. Interestingly, the increase in ELVs material flows is smaller than the increase for 
the production of new cars. This reflects the gradual weight increase of cars in the past. 
Reductions for some materials (e.g. PVC, others) also occurs. 
 
Total material flows of spare parts are slightly increased compared to the base case (Table 
34). For some material flows, there is an increase, for some others, the mass flow decreases 
compared to the base case. The mass flows due to the production and EOL of spare parts are 
almost exactly the same (the small deviation results from the small reduction in transport 
demand – see Section 7.3). Biggest increases occur for rubber/elastomers (2.2 kt), others (0.71 
kt), and other metals (0.69 kt) which are mainly due to an increase of demand for tyres. 
Absolute decreases are greatest for lead (-1.1 kt), PP (-0.1 kt), and other plastics (-0.1 kt) 
because the demand for batteries are reduced. Overall, spare parts only play a minor role 
compared to the mass flows from car production and EOL of cars (Table 33 and Table 34). 
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Table 33: Material flows due to car production for the scrappage scenario (average of 2010 to 2015)  
Material group Material Base case Base case
kt kt [% of BC] kt kt [% of BC]
Metals Aluminium 2 046 2 152 105.2 1 238 1 259 101.7
Copper 216 228 105.2 158 160 101.3
High-strength steels 2 248 2 365 105.2 497 506 101.6
Iron 2 321 2 443 105.2 1 967 1 982 100.8
Lead 164 172 105.2 121 123 101.1
Magnesium 50 52 105.2 30 31 101.9
Steel 9 628 10 130 105.2 8 092 8 199 101.3
Zinc 47 49 105.2 34 35 101.3
Other metals 94 99 105.2 68 69 101.3
Plastics ABS 193 204 105.2 109 112 102.7
PA 95 100 105.2 91 91 100.6
PE 559 589 105.2 347 357 102.9
PET 34 36 105.2 21 22 102.1
PP 2 080 2 188 105.2 1 219 1 248 102.4
PUR 534 562 105.2 370 377 101.7
PVC 7 8 105.2 25 24 96.5
Rubber/Elastomer 494 520 105.2 367 370 101.1
Other plastics 472 497 105.2 461 464 100.7
Fluids Refrigerant 10 10 105.2 4 4 102.0
Oil 141 148 105.2 105 106 101.1
Other fluids 477 502 105.2 345 349 101.2
PGM Palladium 0.035 0.037 104.7 0.015 0.016 103.1
Platinum 0.03 0.031 105.2 0.023 0.023 102.0
Rhodium 0.002 0.002 104.4 0.003 0.003 104.4
Other materials Textile 240 252 105.2 175 177 101.3
Glass 543 571 105.2 395 399 101.3
Other 678 713 105.2 764 756 99.0
Total 23 372 24 590 105.2 17 003 17 220 101.3
Car production End-of-life
Scrappage scenario Scrappage scenario
 
 
Table 34: Material flows due to production or EOL of spare parts for the scrappage scenario 
(average of 2010 to 2015)  
Production EOL 
kt kt kt [% of BC] kt [% of BC]
Lead 338 338 337 99.66 337 99.66
Zinc 19 19 19 100.24 19 100.24
Other metals 284 284 284 100.24 284 100.24
PP 34 34 34 99.66 34 99.66
Rubber/Elastomer 908 908 910 100.24 910 100.24
Other plastics 17 17 17 99.66 17 99.66
Refrigerant 11 11 11 101.44 11 101.44
Oil 491 491 491 100.01 491 100.01
Palladium 0.03 0.03 0.03 101.06 0.025 101.06
Platinum 0.03 0.03 0.03 100.59 0.028 100.59
Rhodium 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.4 0.003 98.4
Textile 95 95 95 100.24 95 100.24
Other 785 785 785 100.09 785 100.09
Total 2 980 2 980 2 982 100.09 2 983 100.09
Base case Scrappage scenario
Production EOL 
Other materials
Material group
Metals
Plastics
Fluids
PGM
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The material flows from the EOL of cars and spare parts according to treatment technologies 
are shown in Table 35. The policy is expected to result in small increases in the different 
material flows and related waste treatment activities. 
 
Table 35: EOL treatment due to the EOL of cars and spare parts for the base case and the 
scrappage scenario (average of 2010 to 2015) 
kt 
Recycling, 
recovery 
& reuse 
Shredder ARS disposal& landfill 
Hazardous waste 
incinerator Export Total 
Base case 8 429 7 494 3 865 5 189 19 983 
Scrappage scenario 8 499 7 583 3 926 5 190 20 202 
Difference 0.84% 1.18% 1.57% 0.01% 0.24% 1.10% 
 
The environmental impacts due to the production of cars and spare parts are shown in Table 
36. Compared to the base case, these environmental impacts increase for all impact 
categories, except for abiotic depletion and eutrophication associated with spare-parts 
production. The increase is the most pronounced for the production of new cars. Overall 
environmental impacts are increased from 1.7% to 4.5%. 
 
Table 36: Environmental impacts due to the production of cars and spare parts for the scrappage 
scenario (average from 2010 to 2015)  
Base case Base case Base case
[% of BC] [% of BC] [% of BC]
AD kt Sb eq 9.47 9.96 105.2 12.45 12.41 99.7 21.92 22.38 102.0
GWP Mt CO2 eq 91.68 96.45 105.2 9.69 9.72 100.3 101.37 106.17 104.5
POCP kt C2H4 eq 134.5 141.5 105.2 24.7 24.7 100.2 159.2 166.2 104.3
AP kt SO2 eq 1327.3 1394.3 105.0 495.9 499.0 100.6 1823.2 1893.3 103.4
EP kt PO4 eq 109.7 115.4 105.2 9.9 9.8 99.9 119.6 125.3 104.2
BW Mt  4.37 4.60 105.2 1.15 1.15 100.3 5.52 5.75 104.7
Scrappage scenario Scrappage scenario
Production of cars
Scrappage scenario
Production of spare parts Total
 
 
7.4.3 Life-cycle impacts 
 
Combining the results derived in section 5.2.3 and in 5.2.4, the life-cycle impacts from the car 
fleet in the base case scenario and in the policy scenario can be calculated. The results are 
shown in Table 37 in the case of the scrappage policy case s10_2000_2000. The benefits 
expected at the WTW level are shown to be (at least) partly offset by the additional impacts 
induced by the production of cars and spare parts. 
 
Table 37: Impacts of the scrappage instrument on the life-cycle impacts from the car fleet 
basecase s10 2000_2000
% change 
w.r.t 
basecase
basecase s10 2000_2000
% change 
w.r.t 
basecase
basecase s10 2000_2000
% change 
w.r.t 
basecase
abiotic depletion (kg Sb eq) 0 0 -1.6% 22 22 2.1% 22 22 2.1%
GHG (Mt CO2-eq) 1 122 1 104 -1.6% 101 106 4.7% 1 223 1 210 -1.0%
acidification (kt SO2 eq) 3 710 3 582 -3.4% 1 823 1 893 3.8% 5 534 5 476 -1.0%
eutrophication (kt PO4 eq) 490 468 -4.5% 120 125 4.8% 609 593 -2.7%
POCP (kt C2H4 eq) 2 960 2 777 -6.2% 159 166 4.4% 3 119 2 943 -5.7%
bulk waste (Mt) 0 0 -1.6% 6 6 4.2% 6 6 4.1%
WTW Production Total
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7.5 Economic impacts 
 
7.5.1 Effects on household and expenditures and taxation 
 
The major consequences of the scrappage system on costs incurred at EU27 level concern the 
following cost components (Figure 41) and include: 
• Purchase costs (retailer price): the scrappage policy stimulate the new car market and 
results in very high additional car sales.  
• Registration taxes (and also owner taxes): the net effect mainly results from the 
combination of more car sales (thus more revenue from the pre-existing registration tax) 
and the subsidy which is granted to car scrappage. The subsidy does not compensate the 
increase in purchase cost thus causing total transport cost to increase.  
• Fuel costs (and fuel tax): The penetration of more efficient cars reduces the fuel 
consumption and thus the fuel costs. 
• Repair costs may be lower during the scheme and even in the first years after the 
scheme, as the vehicle fleet will be considerably younger, requiring less repair cost. 
When looking at the period 2015-2020, there is an increase of repair costs. 
 
These costs over the period 2010 and 2015 are detailed in Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41: Differences in costs between simulations and basecase scenario – average over the period 
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In total, costs and tax revenue is expected to show a trend similar to the car sales (Figure 42). 
 
Over the period 2010-2015, the consumer expenditures for cars would, on average, increase 
by 1.5% to 11.4% compared to the basecase (Table 38). The purchase tax (including VAT) 
revenue is expected to increase (4.5% to 42%) while fuel tax revenue would decrease (0.7%-
4.2%). The total tax revenue is expected to increase (0.6%-7.8%). 
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Figure 42: Total costs and taxation revenue over the period 2010-2020 
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Table 38: Differences in consumer expenditures and tax revenue between the simulations and the 
basecase scenario – average over the period 2010-2015 
s8  
1000_1000
s8  
2000_2000
s8  
2500_2500
s10 
1000_1000
s10 
2000_2000
s10 
2500_2500
s10  
500_1500
s10  
1000_3000
s10  1500_ 
500
s10  
3000_1000
purchase cost & 
others 18 465 79 205 112 169 18 465 78 960 110 614 40 711 134 751 16 168 63 844
fuel cost -642 -2 675 -3 818 -642 -2 658 -3 706 -619 -2 485 -896 -2 789
total cost 17 823 76 530 108 352 17 823 76 302 106 909 40 093 132 266 15 272 61 055
(%BC) (1.5%) (6.6%) (9.3%) (1.5%) (6.6%) (9.2%) (3.5%) (11.4%) (1.3%) (5.3%)
registration tax 1 175 5 507 7 697 1 175 5 495 7 589 2 820 8 875 898 4 180
fuel tax -914 -3 701 -5 150 -914 -3 686 -5 016 -812 -3 224 -1 382 -4 096
other tax 2 718 11 711 16 537 2 718 11 669 16 292 6 007 19 836 2 402 9 458
total tax 2 980 13 517 19 084 2 980 13 479 18 865 8 015 25 488 1 918 9 542
(%BC) (0.9%) (4.2%) (5.9%) (0.9%) (4.1%) (5.8%) (2.5%) (7.8%) (0.6%) (2.9%)  
 
 
Table 39: Differences in consumer expenditures and tax revenue between the simulations and the 
basecase scenario – average over the period 2010-2020 
s8  
1000_1000
s8  
2000_2000
s8  
2500_2500
s10 
1000_1000
s10 
2000_2000
s10 
2500_2500
s10  
500_1500
s10  
1000_3000
s10  1500_ 
500
s10  
3000_1000
purchase cost & 
others 4 784 22 989 35 685 4 784 22 873 34 791 8 291 37 185 6 134 23 401
fuel cost -470 -1 776 -2 381 -470 -1 762 -2 290 -549 -1 575 -582 -1 693
total cost 4 315 21 213 33 304 4 315 21 111 32 501 7 742 35 610 5 552 21 708
(%BC) (0.4%) (1.7%) (2.7%) (0.4%) (1.7%) (2.7%) (0.6%) (2.9%) (0.5%) (1.8%)
registration tax 208 1 047 1 690 208 1 043 1 647 416 1 933 208 900
fuel tax -737 -2 756 -3 641 -737 -2 744 -3 521 -867 -2 476 -963 -2 757
other tax 702 3 407 5 294 702 3 388 5 147 1 231 5 512 920 3 527
total tax 173 1 699 3 343 173 1 687 3 273 780 4 968 165 1 670
(%BC) (0.1%) (0.5%) (1.0%) (0.1%) (0.5%) (1.0%) (0.2%) (1.5%) (0.0%) (0.5%)  
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7.5.2 Indirect economic impacts 
 
The indirect economic impacts of the scrappage scenarios have been calculated according the 
input-output methodology described in Section 4.5. Table 40 shows the change in total 
household expenditure according to industry sectors for the scrappage scenarios for the period 
2010-2015. Compared to the base case, expenditure is increased for passenger cars, trade 
services, and market services for all scenarios. 
 
Table 40: Base case expenditure by household (M€) and relative change in the scrappage scenarios 
– average of the period 2010-2015  
Sector BC
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Agriculture 132695 -0.28% -1.20% -1.71% -0.28% -1.20% -1.69% -0.60% -2.02% -0.25% -0.99%
Construction 1113110 -0.01% -0.06% -0.09% -0.01% -0.06% -0.09% -0.03% -0.10% -0.01% -0.05%
Market services 3341999 0.04% 0.16% 0.23% 0.04% 0.16% 0.23% 0.10% 0.30% 0.03% 0.12%
Non-market services 3180579 -0.07% -0.30% -0.42% -0.07% -0.29% -0.42% -0.15% -0.50% -0.06% -0.24%
Trade services 1656805 0.04% 0.12% 0.12% 0.04% 0.12% 0.12% 0.08% 0.21% 0.05% 0.09%
Metals 149605 -0.04% -0.19% -0.27% -0.04% -0.19% -0.26% -0.09% -0.31% -0.04% -0.15%
Chemicals 286680 -0.13% -0.56% -0.80% -0.13% -0.56% -0.79% -0.28% -0.95% -0.12% -0.47%
Non-metallic minerals 39994 -0.16% -0.71% -1.01% -0.16% -0.71% -1.00% -0.35% -1.19% -0.15% -0.59%
Pulp, paper & printing 144014 -0.25% -1.09% -1.55% -0.25% -1.08% -1.53% -0.54% -1.83% -0.23% -0.90%
Food, beverages & 
tobacco 635418 -0.30% -1.30% -1.86% -0.30% -1.30% -1.84% -0.65% -2.19% -0.28% -1.08%
Textiles 198496 -0.27% -1.15% -1.64% -0.27% -1.15% -1.62% -0.57% -1.93% -0.24% -0.95%
Machinery & equipment 984844 -0.04% -0.19% -0.27% -0.04% -0.19% -0.27% -0.10% -0.32% -0.04% -0.16%
Other industries 309777 -0.19% -0.82% -1.18% -0.19% -0.82% -1.16% -0.41% -1.39% -0.17% -0.68%
Passenger cars 225624 3.95% 17.65% 25.54% 3.95% 17.59% 25.18% 8.76% 29.89% 3.34% 14.29%
Other motor vehicles 251280 -0.01% -0.03% -0.04% -0.01% -0.03% -0.03% -0.02% -0.04% 0.00% 0.01%
Automotive fuels 99928 -0.34% -1.41% -2.02% -0.34% -1.40% -1.95% -0.25% -1.12% -0.51% -1.54%
Other energy 169672 -0.28% -1.19% -1.69% -0.28% -1.18% -1.67% -0.59% -1.99% -0.25% -0.98%
Total 12920518 0.02% 0.10% 0.15% 0.02% 0.10% 0.14% 0.06% 0.20% 0.01% 0.07%
 
 
 
This reflects the increase in car sales (Figure 39). As a consequence, households will reduce 
their expenditure of other goods accordingly. 
 
Total employment increases for all scrappage scenarios. The only exception is the scenario 
s10_1500_500 which shows employment change very close to zero (Figure 43). Total 
employment effects range from about 0 to 133 000 employees, corresponding to a change of 
0% to 0.06% compared to the basecase. 
 
Sectoral results show positive employment effects in the sectors passenger cars, other motor 
vehicles, market services, trade services, and metals for all scenarios. Negative impacts occur 
in most other sectors for all scenarios. 
 
Impacts on value added (Figure 44) are in general less pronounced than for employment. 
Impacts at individual industry sector level range from -1.7% to +30%. Total value added 
increases from 0.01% to +0.16% which corresponds to about 1400 to 18000 M€). 
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Figure 43: Employment effects of the scrappage scenarios in 1 000 employees over 2010-2015.  
A: Total employment effects; B: Sectoral employment effects 
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Figure 44: Value added effects of the scrappage scenarios in M€ for the period 2010-2015.  
A: Total value added effects; B: Sectoral value added effects 
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7.6 Concluding remarks 
 
The above analysis and results provide an overview of the environmental and economic 
effects of a scrappage policy instrument when applied at EU27 level. The focus was on the 
cash for-replacement case. 
 
The TREMOVE scenario exercise leads to the conclusion that this policy would strongly and 
swiftly stimulate the removal of old cars and, consequently, boost new car sales. 
 
The size of the effects is predominantly determined by the level of the scrappage subsidy. 
Dramatic sales increases are projected with subsidies as high as 2000€. 
 
Most of its effects can be expected as soon as after 2 years, unless the subsidy starts with low 
levels and then gradually increases. 
 
Regarding the old cars scrapped, old small (petrol) cars would be scrapped at a larger scale 
than others, and overall, the share of bigger cars in the car fleet may be increased. 
 
Concerning the effects on air quality, the instrument is expected to result in a decline of 
emissions faster than what is already expected in the baseline scenario. Under the scrappage 
policy, the reduced emission levels expected during the period 2015-2020 in the baseline 
scenario would be reached 2 years earlier (in the case of NOx and PM emissions) and 4 years 
earlier (in the case of CO and VOC emissions). 
 
The effects on CO2 emissions are more ambiguous. Small reductions are modeled, however, 
with a significant degree of uncertainty. Any benefit disappears once the scheme is phased 
out. 
 
One key aspect, also pointed out in the literature, is the importance of the expected energy 
efficiency leap from the old scrapped car to the new one to ensure real benefits. The leap 
expected under a subsidy implemented today would be modest. It would be much higher if the 
policy instrument were postponed when the emissions from new cars would be closer to the 
2015 target (130 g/km) or even later when the 2020 target (95 g/km) is approached.  
 
Also, the fact that the scrappage policy instrument would, in the short term, pull up sales of 
slightly more efficient cars, means that the car fleet renewal would later be reduced, when car 
emissions are substantially declining. This means that the scrappage policy could potentially 
reduce the effects of the policy target.  
 
From an environmental point of view, the scrappage policy would come late with regards to 
air pollution, and too early with regards GHG emissions. 
 
In addition, the emissions from the increased car manufacturing partly compensate for the 
WTW emission reductions. 
 
Overall, the household expenditures for cars would increase. Also the tax revenue from 
passenger cars would increase because the subsidy far from absorbs the increased revenue of 
the registration tax resulting from the increased sales. One might expect that in reality, the tax 
revenue would be lower as some people who would have replaced their car anyway would 
benefit from the subsidy. The outcome may also depend on the registration tax which varies 
from country to country. 
CASH FOR REPLACEMENT POLICY 
91 
 
As regards macroeconomic impacts, the Input-Output tables modeling suggests that the 
sectors directly concerned (the automotive sector and supplying sectors, including metal 
sector) would gain both in terms of value added and employment. The extra expenditures that 
households are expected to dedicate to cars would entail reductions of expenditures to other 
goods. This would result in employment and value added reductions in the other sectors, in 
the same order of magnitude as the gain expected for the benefiting sectors. This effect would 
be only moderated by the recycling of the tax revenue across all sectors. 
 
The net effects would consist of a very small net employment creation and the policy 
instrument would be close to neutral in terms of employment. This would of course, hold true 
only if fast adjustments occur (as assumed in the modeling exercise). 
 
In conclusion, the scrappage policy would primarily benefit the automotive sector and supply 
sectors and only to a certain extent (and only in the short term). Other economic sectors would 
be negatively affected. 
 
The focus of this analysis was on the cash-for-replacement scheme. One can anticipate that 
the cash-for-scrappage policy would result in lower car sale increases. However the policy 
could better address the lower affordability of low-income households for buying a new car 
(even under a scrappage subsidy) and, would also, stimulate a shift to public transport.  
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8 Combined scenario 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
As suggested by the literature, the combination of a feebate system with a scrappage scheme 
could result in a mutually corrective interaction between some of the perverse effects and 
could also entail some positive synergies. 
 
These interactions were modelled in TREMOVE by combining the two approaches described 
in sections 6.2 and 7.1 for the feebate and the scrappage policy respectvely, using the relevant 
policy parameters. 
 
The main purpose in this chapter is to illustrate the effects of the interactions of both policy 
instruments when implemented simultaneously. To this end, the combination of the feebate 
130_1_1 with the scrappage case s8_1000_1000 is used as an illustration of the main effects 
of such combinations. 
 
 
8.2 Direct impacts 
 
An important point of interaction between the two combined policy types is the purchase cost 
of new vehicles. Due to a feebate system, the purchase costs increases because of abatement 
costs. This gives two effects in combination with the scrappage scheme: first, the decision to 
scrap a car will alter slightly (the purchase cost of a new vehicle is a decision parameter in the 
scrappage model); secondly, due to increased purchase cost, in combination with increased 
vehicle turnover under the scrappage scheme, total transport cost will increase even more than 
compared to the scrappage simulation exclusively. 
 
The consequences of these interactions on the new car sales are in Figure 45 which provides 
the evolution of the new cars sales over the period 2010-2020. During the policy period, sales 
increases are expected, in a similar magnitude as what is expected with the scrappage policy 
alone. The difference slightly increases at the end of the period. After the policy period, the 
sales follow the same trend as with the scrappage alone but they are slightly lower. 
 
Figure 45: Evolution of new car sales with a combination scenario, compared with the base case and 
the two corresponding individual feebate and scrappage scenarios  
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The combination also results in a modified distribution of new car sales in terms of fuel types 
(Figure 46): Unlike to what happens with the feebate case alone, diesel cars sales are 
increased together with petrol car. On the other hand, the share of diesel cars in sales is lower 
than in the case of the scrappage policy alone. The share of new cars sales in terms of size is 
only slightly changed compared to the scrappage policy. 
 
The average over the periods 2010-2015 and 2010-2020 is summarized in Table 41. 
 
Figure 46: Changes in car sales by fuel types and vehicle size 
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Table 41: Overview of the different impacts over the periods 2010-2015 (average) and 2010-2020 in 
the case of individual feebate/scrappage scenarios and their combination 
f130 
1.0_1.0 combination
s8  
1000_1000
f130 
1.0_1.0 combination
s8  
1000_1000
PCDB -21 64 96 -14 4 27
PCDM -118 209 340 -74 -44 74
PCDS -20 96 119 -12 34 43
PCGB 20 48 21 10 28 2
PCGM 74 247 170 33 113 30
PCGS 56 370 314 19 111 40
total -9 1 033 1 060 -39 247 216
% BC -0.05% 5.43% 5.58% -0.19% 0.67% 1.07%
GHG -1.8% -2.3% -0.4% -2.1% -2.4% -0.3%
CO -0.1% -8.8% -8.7% -0.1% -7.4% -7.3%
Nox -0.5% -2.2% -1.7% -0.6% -1.9% -1.3%
Sox -2.0% -2.7% -0.6% -2.2% -2.8% -0.4%
VOC -0.5% -5.7% -5.2% -0.5% -5.0% -4.5%
PM -1.1% -1.8% -0.7% -1.2% -1.8% -0.6%
registration tax 4 600 5 942 1 175 2 483 2 775 208
fuel cost -2 315 -3 129 -642 -3 435 -4 071 -470
fuel tax -2 620 -3 660 -914 -3 785 -4 620 -737
total cost 10 897 28 981 17 823 2 381 6 156 4 315
(%BC) (0.9%) (2.5%) (1.5%) (0.2%) (0.5%) (0.4%)
total tax 3 039 6 076 2 980 -1 250 -1 187 173
(%BC) (0.9%) (1.9%) (0.9%) -(0.4%) -(0.3%) (0.1%)
average changes over 2010-2020
change of 
new vehicle 
stock  
(1000 
units)
WTW 
emissions 
reductions 
(% 
baseline)
Costs 
changes 
(million 
euros)
average changes over 2010-2015
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The key findings, also expected with other combinations, are as follows: 
• The changes in new car sales are only slightly lower than those expected from the 
scrappage policy case. 
• The WTW emissions, as compared with the basecase, are close to the cumulated effects 
of the individual scenarios. Due to the feebate system, the emissions from newly 
purchased cars will indeed be lower compared to the basecase. With a scrappage 
scheme in place, the scrapped-replacing vehicles have lower CO2-emissions, thus 
causing a more explicit effect on CO2-reduction. 
• The different cost components are also close to the cumulated costs of the 
corresponding individual scenarios.  
 
Similar observations are made with respect to long term effects (period 2010-2020). 
 
 
8.3 Indirect impacts 
 
The impacts on employment and value added were calculated with the approach described in 
section 4.5. The results for the combination are compared to the estimates made for the 
corresponding feebate and scrappage policy case (Figure 47). These results show the benefit 
of combining a scrappage policy with a feebate system as the individual effects on total 
employments are shown to accumulate. However this accumulation effect might also be 
expected in terms of sectors that would experience employment losses under the scrappage 
policy. 
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Figure 47: Employment effects of one combined scenario (1 000 employees) over 2010-2015.  
A: Total employment effects; B: Sectoral employment effects 
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8.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The above results illustrate the general effects that can be expected when coupling the feebate 
and scrappage policy instruments. 
 
The sales of new cars would be very close to what the scrappage policy would induce 
individually. 
 
The respective benefits of both policy instruments would be accumulated, thus, securing the 
longer term reductions on GHG emissions and, also accelerating the already expected benefit 
for air quality.  
 
The combination would also enhance the positive effects on employment in the automotive-
related sectors but also, potentially worsen the negative effects on the other sectors. 
 
As discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.3, the combination would enable, at least partly, an 
avoidance of some perverse effects of the individual instruments. One of them is the indirect 
incentive from the feebate policy to extend the life of old big cars. This effect and possible 
correction by the scrappage instrument cannot however, be modeled with TREMOVE.
 97 
CONCLUSIONS 
98 
 
9 Conclusions 
 
This report analyses two policy instruments designed to reduce the environmental impacts 
from passenger cars. The first instrument, the feebate system, is a way to differentiate the 
registration tax according to the CO2 emissions from cars and has been implemented in 
several countries in the recent past. The second instrument, the scrappage policy is intended 
to encourage owners of old cars to scrap their car sooner. In the cash-for-replacement variant, 
the old car has to then be replaced by a new car. In the other variant, the cash-for-scrappage 
one, there is no condition regarding the subsequent use of the subsidy. 
 
For both policy instruments, the assessment, made at the EU27 level, has covered the 
environmental impacts from the car fleet, including those resulting from the fuel used by cars 
(WTW emissions) and also those associated with the production of cars and spare parts. 
 
The economic impacts were also quantified, both direct impacts (car sales, transport demand 
and resulting expenditures for households and tax revenues) and indirect impacts on the whole 
economy (employment and value added in the different economic sectors). 
 
This analysis was carried out by further developing and implementing the TREMOVE model 
and exploiting its different results in the Input-Ouput table framework. 
 
The methodological developments are based on different types of data of which the 
availability and quality determine the confidence of the quantified results. There is obvious 
room for improvement in the future. Nevertheless, some key conclusions can be drawn from 
this assessment. 
 
For both policy instruments, several policy variants have been considered, giving some 
indications of the influence of the scheme parameters, but also, providing some ranges of the 
expected effects. These policy variants and their expected effects are compared in Table 42. 
 
In general, a feebate system is almost neutral in terms of total new car sales, but given the 
incentive to move the purchase decision to lower CO2 emitting cars, the policy instrument 
would result in reductions in GHG emissions from cars. This holds true both in the short term 
but also in the long term. Positive effects on air pollution, though of less importance, are also 
expected. Both types of effects are preserved even if all life-cycle impacts are considered. 
 
In total, households would spend more money on cars because of higher purchase costs which 
are not fully compensated by the fuel cost savings. Budget neutrality for the government is 
also shown to be achievable, especially in the short term, but may be lost in a long term. 
 
In general, the real-life outcome may vary depending on the initial purchasing patterns and the 
initial taxation regime which both depend on the situation of each country. 
 
At a macro-economic level, the sectors directly concerned (the automotive sector and the 
supply sectors, including the metal sectors) would gain both in terms of value added and 
employment. Depending on the feebate scheme, the effects on other sectors would be either 
neutral or negative. 
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Table 42: Overview of results for the feebate and for the scrappage policies and their combination  
Numbers give the percentage changes relative to the corresponding total baseline quantities 
(first, average value; second, range of values in italic) 
 
2010 - 2015
Total -0.1% -0.3% to 0.1% 25.4% 4.7% to 41.5%
Fuel
Size
2010 - 2020 -0.3% -0.5% to -0.2% 6.0% 1.1% to 13.7%
Well-to-wheel emissions
2010 - 2015
GHG -1.6% -2.6% to -0.7% -1.3% -2.6% to -0.4%
CO -0.1% -0.1% to -0.1% -18.4% -29.9% to -7.0%
NOx -0.4% -0.7% to -0.2% -3.8% -6.7% to -1.4%
SOx -1.7% -2.7% to -0.7% -1.9% -3.8% to -0.6%
VOC -0.4% -0.7% to -0.2% -8.8% -13.0% to -3.8%
PM -0.9% -1.5% to -0.4% -2.6% -5.6% to -0.7%
2010 - 2020
GHG -1.8% -2.9% to -0.8% -0.8% -1.3% to -0.3%
NOx, PM
CO, VOC
Life cycle impacts (2010-2015)
2010-2015
Total costs for the consumer 0.9% 0.5% to 1.2% 4.4% 1.0% to 9.0%
Total tax revenue 1.2% -0.4% to 2.6% 2.9% 0.5% to 6.4%
Total employment 0.04% -0.01% to 0.08% 0.02% 0.00% to 0.06%
                         (Most probably overestimated reductions)
                         (Most probably overestimated reductions)
Effects declining slowly up to 2020
Economic impacts 
Of the same order of impacts on Well-to-
wheel emissions
Well-to-wheel emissions reductions partly compensated 
for by the increased impacts from production of cars 
and spare parts
Effects declining slowly up to 2020
Baseline emission reductions expected over 2010-2020 
brought forward by 2 years
Baseline emission reductions expected over 2010-2020 
brought forward by 4 years
Scrappage policyFeebate policy
Diesel cars share slightly increased in the fleet
Environmental impacts
Big/medium cars share slightly increased in the fleetPossible shift from medium to small
Car sales
Shift from diesel to petrol
 
 
 
The scrappage policy leads to a fast car fleet renewal. Most of the effects are observed after 
only 2 years, unless the subsidy starts with low levels and then gradually increases. The size 
of the effects is predominantly determined by the subsidy level. Dramatic sales increases are 
projected with subsidies as high as 2000€.  
 
This rapid car fleet renewal would also help accelerate the expected decline of air emissions. 
The conclusions regarding CO2 emissions are more ambiguous. In any case, the effects would 
be temporary. 
 
The expected leap in energy efficiency from the old scrapped car to the new one during the 
operation of the system (2010-2015) would not be sufficient to enable real gains in terms of 
energy and CO2 emissions. A higher gain would result from a delayed scheme because, in that 
case, the system would operate when the new car emissions would be declining according to 
the regulatory CO2 emission targets (130 g/km by 2015, 95 g/km by 2020).  
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The scrappage policy (as applied alone) can thus be said to come late with regard to air 
pollution and, too early with regard to GHG emissions. All the environmental impacts 
(including the impacts from the car manufacturing sector) have to be considered also, 
including the impacts from car manufacturing, which can substantially increase, and partly 
compensate for WTW emission reductions. 
 
Overall, the household expenditures for cars would increase alongside the tax revenue from 
passenger cars. 
 
The policy would clearly benefit to the employment in the sectors directly concerned (the 
automotive sector and supplying sectors, including metal sector). Employment and value 
added reductions are expected in the other sectors, in the same order of magnitude as the gain 
expected for the benefiting sectors. The net effects would consist of a very small net 
employment creation.  
 
When comparing the two policy instruments and their environmental impacts, it can be 
concluded that the feebate system offers clear, significant and long-term benefits with regard 
to energy savings and CO2 emission reductions. Thus, the feebate system would help reach 
the goal of the EU strategy to reduce CO2 emission from cars. The emission reductions (~236 
Mt CO2-eq over the period 2010-2020) would indeed complement the expected effects of the 
supply-side element of that strategy, namely, the regulation on CO2 emissions from carsa. 
 
The benefits from the scrappage policy are less convincing in terms of CO2 emissions. 
However, there are rapid and important effects in terms of air pollutant emissions, even 
though they mainly consist of bringing forward baseline improvements by 2 to 4 years. 
 
Moderate and high increases in car expenditures for the consumers are expected from the 
feebate and the scrappage policy, respectively. The short term revenue for the Governments is 
expected to increase in both case, although, specific feebate schemes might result in net costs. 
 
Both instruments are expected to result in a comparable small net creation of employment at 
EU27 level. However, the sector distribution of benefits would differ: the scrappage policy 
would the most benefit the automotive and related sectors. It would however entail 
employment losses in other sectors in all cases, whereas, the feebate instrument offers options 
to limit such negative consequences.  
 
This report shows the advantages of coupling the two policy instruments, feebate and 
scrappage. The respective benefits of both policy instruments would be accumulated, thus 
ensuring long-term reductions in GHG emissions and also accelerating the already expected 
benefits for air quality. 
 
It has to be noted that, besides such a combination, other options could be envisaged in order 
to avoid potential negative effects from the scrappage on the long term GHG emissions. One 
option would consist in applying CO2-based criteria on the new car replacing the scrapped 
one. 
 
                                                 
a According to the impact assessment made in the framework of the preparation of the CO2&car regulation (which, at that 
time, assumed the 130 g CO2/km target achieved by 2012, and did not assume the later adopted target for 2020 – 95 g 
CO2/km) the GHG emission reductions over the period 2006-2020 would be higher than 625 Mt CO2-eq. 
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This coupling would secure the environmental benefits, enhance the positive effects on 
employment in the automotive-related sectors. It could however worsen the negative effects 
on the other sectors that are expected under the individual scrappage policy. 
 
Another option for reducing the GHG emissions from cars, which is not explicitly addressed 
by the regulation on CO2 emissions from cars, is the reduction in the weight of cars. The 
project has estimated the related technical potential and its impacts. A scenario assuming a 
gradual decrease in car weight by 15% by 2030 compared to the current situation, suggests 
that 246 Mt CO2-eq could be avoided over the period 2006 to 2020. 
 
Worth noting is that the project was initiated and conducted in an economic context which 
later changed rapidly, including oil price and economic growth. Interpreting the project results 
against this new context is not straightforward. The objective of creating employment is now 
converted into an objective to avoid (and even attenuate) losses in employment.  
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